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Abstract 
The perception since the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) is that the driving forces 
behind the degradation of the environment are population-induced poverty in the 
developing world, and affluence-induced overconsumption in the developed world. By 
implication, growth in consumption has progressively adverse environmental 
consequences.  Recent work in environmental economics has drawn attention to an 
empirical relation between per capita income and certain indicators of  environmental 
quality that appears to contradict this view. It has been found that various indicators of 
local air and water quality first worsen and then improve as per capita incomes rise. 
This paper reconsiders this work, and extends it to include not just per capita incomes 
but alternative measures of economic and social performance: consumption, the HDI, 
the  income-adjusted HDI and an index of poverty. It confirms that deeping poverty at 
one end of the scale, and increasing affluence at the other, both have implications for 
the environment. But these implications are different. Deepening poverty is associated 
with environmental effects that tend to have immediate and local implications for the 
health and welfare of the communities concerned. Increasing affluence is associated 
with environmental effects which are much more widespread and much longer-lasting. 
It also shows that these are part of a continuum of effects. The environmental 
consequences of economic activity are generally quite specific to the nature of the 
activity, and the type of economic activity tends to be correlated with income. The 
distribution of environmental effects associated with given activities may be mapped 
into the income range associated with those activities. The paper concludes that the 
interesting question about the link between growth, development and the environment is 
not whether economic growth does have environmental consequences.  It is whether its 
environmental consequences threaten the resilience of the ecological systems on which 
economic activities depend. It supports the conclusions of Arrow et al (1995) that the 
EKC is evidence that environmental improvements have occurred in some cases. It is 
not evidence either that they will occur in all cases, or that they will occur in time to 
avert the potentially irreversible environmental effects of economic or human 
development. 
I  The assistance of Alberto Ansuategi in assembling the data and running the regressions reported in 
the appendices is gratefully acknowledged. 
I 1.  Introduction 
The general perception since publication of the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) is that 
the driving forces behind the degradation of the environment are population-induced 
poverty in the developing world, and affluence-induced overconsumption in the 
developed world. In other words, the general perception has been that harmful 
environmental change is to be laid at the door of consumption by the very poor and the 
very rich. While the poor have been argued to lay waste to forests, wetlands, 
rangelands and coastal zones in order to meet their basic needs, fhe rich have been 
argued to consume disproportionate quantities of energy and natural resources, and 
discharge disproportionate quantities of waste as emissions to air and water. By 
implication, growth in consumption has progressively adverse environmental 
consequences. 
In recent years, however, environmental economists have paid increasing attention to an 
empirical relation between per capita income and certain indicators of environmental 
quality that would seem to tell the opposite story. The relation is similar to the Kuznets 
curve (Kuznets, 1955). Just as the Kuznets relation showed that income inequality first 
rises and then falls as per capita income rises, so it has been found that various 
ind icators of local air and water quality first worsen and then improve as per capita 
incomes rise. The relation was tirst observed in work undertaken by Grossman and 
Krueger (1993) on the environmental implications of Mexico's inclusion in the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and was dubbed 'the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve' (EKC) (Panayotou, 1993). 
Subsequently, a Kuznets relation has been found between per capita income and 
emissions of sulphur dioxide (Grossman and Krueger 1993, 1995;  Seldon and Song 
1994; Shafik 1994; Panayotou 1995, 1997), particulates and dark matter (Grossman 
and Krueger 1993), nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide (Seldon and Song 1994), 
carbon dioxide and CFCs (Cole et al,  1997). Grossman and Krueger (1995) have also 
found a Kuznets relation involving various indicators of water quality, including faecal 
coliform, biological and chemical oxygen demand and arsenic. Panayotou (1995) and 
Antle and Heidebrink ( 1995) found the same general relation between deforestation 
rates and per capita income, while Coles et al (1997) have extended it to include energy 
use and traffic volumes. The evidence does not all run in the same direction. Volumes 
of municipal waste have been found to be a strictly increasing function of per capita 
income (Shafik 1994; Coles et al  1997) and there are conflicting results on solid 
particulates (Grissman and Krueger 1995) and carbon dioxide (Shafik 1994). 
Nevertheless, the broad direction of the evidence to date favours the EKe. 
2 Not only does the existence of the EKC appear to suggest that the post-Brundtland view 
on the environmental consequences of  consumption are wrong about the effects of 
poverty and aft1uence, it also appears to suggest that growth in the level of  consumption 
may be environmentally beneficial. While there may be negative envirorunental effects 
during the early stages of growth, these will be counteracted by later environmental 
quality improvements. To the proponents of market-led development strategies, the 
EKe hypothesis has been interpreted as both a rationale for growth and an argument 
against growth-inhibiting environmental protection measures (Beckerman, 1992). This 
is particularly important for developing countries given the trend towards the 
liberalisation of both domestic and international markets as a means of stimulating 
market-led growth. If growth in consumption does, in some sense, 'take care' of the 
environment, the diversion of resources from environmental protection to investment 
may be welfare-enhancing. We need to understand what can and cannot be inferred 
from the EKC for the development process, and for the well-being of people at different 
levels of consumption. 
This paper has three aims. The first is to reconsider the evidence on the EKC in the light 
of recent assessments. This is to clarify what is being said about the linkages between 
economic perfOimance and environmental change. The second aim is to consider the 
relation between environmental quality and alternative measures of performance. These 
include consumption, the Human Development Index, and an index of poverty devised 
for the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The question here is what this 
empirical research can tell us about the linkages identified by the Brundtland Report and 
subsequently embodied in the report of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development: Agenda 21  (UNCED, 1993). The third aim is to use 
these findings to address a number of specific questions concerning the role of 
environmental quality in consumption and development. It has been hypothesised that 
the EKC indicates that environmental quality is in the nature of a lUXUry good: that 
demand for environmental quality is income elastic (McConnell, 1997). The third aim is 
to consider how the importance of environmental resources to human well-being is 
affected by the development process. 
2 .  The Environmental  Kuznets  Curve  Revisited 
The basic model underpinning empirical research into the relation between income and 
environmental quality is of the general form 
3 • 
E"  =  fey"~, C"  X,,) 
where E"  denotes either total or per capita environmental quality in country i and year t; 
Y"  deuotes per capita income in country i at time t; C, denotes country specific effects; 
X"  denotes 'external' factors which may include such things as the level of technology, 
and i and t are country and time indices, This basic model assumes no feedbacks 
between the environment and the economy. A number of existing studies involve cross-
sectional data only, Some use panel data, generally with a more restricted set of 
countries, To test the EKC hypothesis the functional forms employed for estimating the 
basic model from cross country data tends to be quadratic in either levels or logarithms, 
A summary of the main findings of this research is offered in Barbier (1997). While an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and a range of  air pollution 
indicators appears to be reasonably robust, the evidence on water pollutants and 
resource depletion indicators, such as deforestation, is much less clear, In general, the 
results show that well defined EKCs exist only for local air pollutants. The relationship 
between income and environmental quality is dependent on whether there are significant 
externalities and 'stock feedback effects'-typically where the environmental effect is 
cumulative. The kinds of pollutants for which the inverted U relationship has been 
estimated do not have strong stock feedback effects. They also tend to be very 
localised. Environmental effects that are more dispersed in time and space are (that are 
global or occur in the far future) tend to increase with income (Arrow et aI1995). 
Where EKCs have been found for emissions that involve distant or long term effects, 
such as carbon dioxide, the turning points estimated for such emissions involve such 
large standard errors that they cannot be considered reliable (Cole et al  1997). 
The turning points define the levels of per capita income at which emissions start to fall 
as incomes rise further. If an EKC does exist, and if the turning point can be identified 
with confidence, then its location may predict the trend in emissions for countries at a 
different levels of per capita income, At present, estimates of the turning poiuts 
associated with given pollutants vary widely, Although there is considerable evidence to 
support the general form of the relation between sulphur dioxide and per capita income, 
for example, estimates of the turning points for that pollutant range from $3000 
(Panayotou 1995) to SIO,700 (Seldon and Song 1994).  The range of estimates for 
other pollutants is even wider (Table I). Even if we take the most optimistic estimate for 
sulphur dioxide, this indicates that some 90 of the world's low and middle income 
ecouomies still have a long way to go before we would expect to see any improvement 
in per capita emissions. Global income distribution is highly skewed, with median per 
capita income well below the mean. Hence even though global per capita income may 
4 exceed that turning point, emissions will still be increasing in a majority of countries for 
the foreseeable future (Stern et al 1996). A similar story can be told at the national level, 
urban emissions being expected to fall before national emissions. 
Table  1  'Turning points'  for  pollutants  with  a  'Kuznets'  relation  to 
GDP per capita 
Air  pollution  Source  of  estimates 
S02  SPM  NOx  CO  CO2  CFCs 
6900  7300  14700  9900  12600  Cole et al  (1997) 
4107  Grossman and Krueger (1993) 
4053  Grossman and Krueger (1995) 
3000  4500  5500  Panayotou (1995) 
5000  Panayotou (1997) 
10700  9600  21800  19100  Seldon and Song ( 1994) 
3670  3280  Shafik (1994) 
35428  Holtz-Eakin and Seldon (1995) 
12800  Moomaw and Unruh (1997) 
Other  effects 
Faecal  BOD  COD  Arsenic  Nitrates  Dcforest-
coliform  ation 
7955  7623  7853  4900  Grossman and Krueger (1995) 
15600  Cole et al (1997) 
2049  Antle and Heidebrink (1995) 
823  Panayotou (1995) 
4760/  Cropper and Griffiths (1994) 
5420 
Source:  Adapted from Barbier (1997). 
Attempts to predict emissions on the basis of the EKC results illustrate just how far 
there is to go. Stern et al (1996) predict emissions of sulphur dioxide based on 
individual country projections. They find that aggregate emissions of sulphur dioxide 
are expected to rise trom 383 million tonnes in 1990 to 1,181 million tons in 2025. This 
implies a doubling of per capita emissions. Seldon and Song (1994) similarly predict 
increasing aggregate emissions of sulphur and carbon monoxide through 2025, and of 
solid particulates and nitrogen oxides through 2050. 
2.1  Causal  explanations  of the  EKC 
There are various explanations offered in the literature for the EKe. The main 
candidates are income-related changes in the sectoral composition of economies 
(Panayotou 1997; de Bruyn 1997); income related changes in technology (de Bruyn 
1997); the link between income and the demand for environmental quality (McConnell 
1997); and the impact of evironmental constraints to growth (Arrow et al 1995). 
5 The first two are quite intuitive, if a little descriptive.  It is  not surprising that local  air 
and water quality should deteriorate in the first stages of industrialisation in  countries at 
the  dirty end of the product cycle. Nor is  it surprising that local air  and water quality 
should  improve  with  the  expansion  of  the  service  sector  and  the  relocation  of 
'smokestack industries'. This reflects the nature of industrialisation. Industrial growth 
in  the  developing countries  is  frequently  based  on  highly  polluting  industries.  For 
illustration, Table 2 shows that developing countries account for  a steadily  increa~ing 
proportion of world output in  many of the most highly  polluting  industries:  pulp  and 
paper, iron,  steel and  non-ferrous  metals,  petroleum refining  and chemical products. 
This, in turn, reflects the fact that industrial growth in the developing countries depends 
to a considerable extent on the activities of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). 
SMEs  tend  to  be  concentrated  in  the  most  environmentally  damaging  activities  -
chemicals, textiles, leather and fur products, food processing, non-ferrous metal work, 
charcoal and fuelwood supply. 
Table 2  A verage  annual  growth  of polluting  industries 
Branch or industry 
Textiles 
Leather and/itr products 
Pulp and paper  products 
Industrial chemicals 
Petroleum refineries 
Mise. petroleum and coal products 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Source: UNIDO (1992). 
Developed countries 
1975-85  1985-92 
0.2  0.0 
- 0.3  - 0.2 
J.7  3.4 
1.6  3.5 
0.7  1.2 
2.0  J.7 
- 1.5  1.0 
0.9  3.2 
Developing countries 
1975-85  1985-92 
2.8  3.9 
4.4  5.3 
5.0  5.1 
6.7  7.4 
7.8  5.3 
8.1  4.1 
6.4  4.2 
7.2  5.4 
Moreover, although large firms dominate the capital intensive industries like pulp and 
paper, industrial chemicals, petroleum refineries, and iron and steel, many of the 
environmentally more harmful tasks and processes are sub-contracted to SMEs. SMEs 
also tend to rely on older technologies, are difficult to regulate and face fewer incentives 
not to pollute. As a result, growth based on the encouragement of SMEs tends to 
increase environmental risks. The problem here is that the disposal of acids, various 
heavy metals, solvents, cadmium, chromium, inks and dyes, catalysts and oil residues 
is largely unregulated. Indeed, most hazardous waste is simply dumped in landfills or 
disposed of in drains, both options resulting in the contamination of surface and ground 
water (TaIba et al  1992). 
6 The relative impact of structural and technological factors will tend to differ with the 
time horizon over which the problem is evaluated. Decomposition studies of  the 
explanations for emissions reduction over a relatively short horizon, for example, will 
typically assign a greater weight to technological than to structural change (de Bruyn 
1997). In both cases, though, the interesting question is what may be driving changes 
in either structure or teChnology. 
The third explanation- the link between income and the demand for environmental 
quality -implies that the answer is to be found in preferences for environmental 
amenity.  If environmental quality is in the nature of a luxury good then people will 
demand higher environmental quality as per capita incomes rise. McConnell (1997) 
shows that income-related changes in the demand for environmental amenity are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to generate an EKe. But they are at least consistent with the 
EKC, even if the hypothesis is not directly testable. Given that environmental quality 
cannot be bought and sold in markets, changes in demand may be captured only 
indirectly in changes in technology, policy, regulation and consumption of marketed 
goods with greater or lesser environmental impacts. 
A related explanation considers a more generic relation between preferences and 
consumption levels. It has been argued that the link between environmental degradation 
and poverty observed in the Brundtland report is not that the poor care little for the long 
term quality of their environment, but that the poor must worry about the present 
irrespective of the long term environmental costs of their behaviour (Perrings, 1989). In 
many cases. environmental degradation is a consequence of actions designed to meet 
people's current consumption needs. They implicitly discount future costs and benefits 
at a high rate. This hypothesis-that people in poverty discount the future at high 
rates-has since been confirmed in empirical studies of consumption patterns in 
communities in Africa, South Asia and South East Asia (xxx, 1997). It is consistent 
with the fact that the EKC has been found to apply mainly to effects that are localised 
and short term. 
The last explanation-the impact of environmental constraints to growth--stems from a 
critical review of the link between economic growth and environment implicit in the 
EKC literature (Arrow et al  1995). The review argues that the EKC hypothesis ignores 
the environmental context within which economic growth occurs. By focussing on per 
capita emissions it has little to say about about the significance of those emissions. 
Instead. Arrow et al argue that the focus should be on the assimilative or carrying 
capacity of the environment. What matters is not the absolute level of per capita 
7 emissions or depletion, but aggregate emissions or depletion relative to the assimilative 
or carrying capacity of the environment. The general policy problem implicit in the EKC 
is the de['rce to which pollution and other fonns of environmental deterioration can be 
delinkcd from consumption growth. If  they cannot, then at some point consumption 
growth will be halted by the environment's limited capacity to absorb the impacts of 
consumption. 
The point made by Arrow et al (1995) is that growth in consumption is constrained by 
the assimilative or carrying capacity of the environment.  Environmental constraints 
may be relieved by changes in technology, the structure of production or the pattern of 
consumption. Where environmental constraints are not binding there is little incentive to 
reduce emissions or the depletion of environmental resources. Where environmental 
constraints are binding, however, there may be little option but to do so. Moreover, 
where environmental constraints are binding and the population is growing, there may 
be little option but to reduce per capita emissions or rates of depletion. At low levels of 
income, the environmental impacts of consumption may be within the assimilative or 
carrying capacity of the environment. As income rises, however, the constraints 
imposed by the environment tighten. Growth in consumption, whether induced by 
growth in the level of economic activity or growth in population, may be expected to 
close on environmental constraints in various ways, and hence to stimulate 
environmentally conserving responses. 
There is a link here with the notion of 'environmentally sound technology' as promoted 
in Agenda 21  (UNCED, 1993). The criterion for environmentally sound technologies is 
whether they are safe with respect to the external environment. It is largely irrelevant as 
to whether the technology concerned is  'clean', 'best practicable', 'best available', 'low 
waste' or 'resource conserving'. Technologies may be said to be environmentally 
sound if they do not threaten their evironment. Hence technologies at the dirty end of 
the product cycle may still be environmentally sound, providing that they are not used at 
levels which test the resilience of the ecosystems where they are applied.  Exactly the 
same remarks apply to consumption. It is largely irrelevant as to whether the pattern of 
consumption has environmental consequences, so long as consumption is below the 
level at which those consequences test the resilience of the system. 
2.2  The EKC and the  role  of policy 
The central point made by Arrow et al (1995) is that reductions in the emission of 
pollutants has, in almost every case, been induced by regulation or policy to satisfy 
some environmental constraint. The explanation is simple. The environmental effects of 
8 production or consumption are mediated by the market in only a few cases.  In the vast 
majority of cases, these effects are external to the market and so are not registered in the 
transactions between consumers and producers. This may be because of ignorance or 
uncenainty about the nature and extent of the environmental effects of consumption; 
because consumers are 'authorised' to ignore the effects of their actions on others by 
the structure of rights in a society; or because the environment concerned is in the nature 
of a public good--of benefit to all but the responsibility of none. Where market prices 
are unable to signal convergence on some environmental constraint, adjustments tend to 
be made in the political arena as a belated response to evidence of environmental 
degradation. 
Two things follow from this. First, the assumption implicit in the basic model that there 
are no feedback effects from the environment to the economy is unhelpful. There are no 
market prices attaching to environmental effects, but the development of environmental 
laws and regulations responds to evidence of the consequences of environmental 
change. In terms of the econometrics of the problem, estimation of single equation 
relationships where there are feedback effects necessarily introduces biases, and may 
result in inconsistent estimates (Stem et aI,  1996). Moreover, the interpretation given to 
the invened-U shaped relation that countries can grow out of environmental problems 
without appropriate environmental policies is misleading. 
Second, the severity of the environmental consequences of economic activity at 
different levels of income is sensitive to the nature and effectiveness of environmental 
policy. Panayotou (1997) uses a panel of data from 30 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1982-1994 to test the sensitivity of the relation between 
sulphur dioxide emissions, GDP per capita, a set of country effects including the rate of 
growth, the sectoral structure of the economy, and its population density together with a 
policy variable-the enforcement of contracts. He concludes that the effectiveness of 
policy can help to flatten the EKe, or to lower the turning point. He notes that where 
there are environmental thresholds this can contribute to the sustainability of growth by 
preventing the economy from overshooting those thresholds. 
This last point is imponant. If there are significant irreversibilities, or effects are very 
expensive to reverse, future increases in current national income may offer no 
protection against environmental degradation. Effects in this category include national 
environmental issues such as soil erosion, depletion of ground water reservoirs, and 
desenification. They also include global issues such as climate change and biodiversity 
loss. Arrow et al (1995) conclude that economic growth is not a panacea for improving 
environmental quality. They emphasise, however, that this is not an argument against 
9 economic growth per se, but against the presumption (a) that growth will automatically 
resolve the problem of environmental degradation and (b) that growth is automatically 
environmentally sustainable, 
3 .  Environmental  quality,  consumption  and  human  development 
Most of the  empirical  research  on  the  relation  between  econOllllC  performance  and 
environmental change  has  focussed  on  measures  of per capita income,  This  section 
considers  other  performance  measures  in  an  effort  to  identify  the  linkage  between 
environmental change and (a) consumption of marketed goods and services, and (b)  the 
process of human development. Specifically, it considers the  relationship between four 
measures of environmental change and the same number of performance meaures,  The 
four  measures  of environmental change  reflect  qualitatively  different  impacts  of the 
development process. They comprise: 
•  a measure of water pollution-lack of access to safe water supplies; 
•  a measure of industrial pollution---emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO,); 
•  a measure of the depletion of environmental resources---<ieforestation; and 
•  a measure of greenhouse gas emissions--carbon dioxide (CO,), 
The question raised in this section is how these various environmental effects are related 





a measure of income-income per capita (PPP adjusted); 
a measure of consumption-private and government consumption per capita; 
a measure of development-the Human Development Index; 
a  measure  of poverty-an IF  AD  index  of rural  poverty  in  the  developing 
countries. 
The inclusion of the  first of these provides a direct point of comparison w;th the EKC 
literature,  and  makes  it  possible to  identify  and  analyse  the  differences  that  use  of 
alternative  measures  implies.  Since  the  aim  is  to  consider  the  relation  between 
environmental change and these performance measures in comparison with the existing 
literature,  it  employs  the  most  common  approach  in  the  literature  so  far-an OLS 
treatment  of cross  sectional  data.  This  means  that  the  results  are  subject  to  all  the 
limitations of this  approach noted  in  the existing literature  (cf Stern  et  ai,  1996).  For 
similar reasons,  it  uses  performance measures for  the  same period as  the studies  with 
which  it  is  being  compared.  The  implications  of changes  in  the  measures  since  this 
period are discussed in the concluding section. 
10 3.1  The  environmental  indicators 
Of the  four  environmental  indicators  selected  for  analysis  here,  two  currently  attract 
most  attention  in  low  income  countries.  The  pollution  and  depletion  of local  water 
supplies is  one.  Deforestation  and  the  allied problem of desertification  is  the  other. 
Emissions of SO, and CO2 being primarily by-products of industrialisation, attract more 
attention in middle and upper income countries. The problems are, however, all  linked. 
Water pollution and  depletion  are  of concern for many  reasons,  not  least  being  the 
immediate  effects  on  human  health  and  productivity.  But  from  an  environmental 
perspective the main significance of water depletion lies in its impact on plant available 
moisture  and  so  the  structure  and  productivity  of ecological  and  agro-ecological 
systems. Because deforestation  and  desertification  affect  the  hydrological cycle,  they 
are  linked  with  the  depletion  and  pollution  of  water  supplies.  Deforestation  and 
desertification are also linked with the carbon cycle both through emissions due to land 
use change, and through their effect on the capacity of forests to sequestrate carbon. 
Water depletion and pollution 
Water  depletion  frequently  represents  the  mmmg  of a  natural  resource  to  support 
growth  in  agricultural  output  and  employment.  In  many  cases,  for  example,  water 
resources are being depleted to  increase the area under agricultural production, as  well 
as the productivity of existing agricultural lands. In both instances it is closely related to 
the problems of water pollution. The relative intensity of renewable water use,  and  the 
sectoral distribution  of renewable  water  withdrawals  over the  period  1972-1992  are 
indicated in Table 3.  The table shows that only the Middle East and North Africa come 
close to using all of the available renewable water resources.  In  most cases, developing 
countries use less  than ten  per cent of available renewable  resources.  The  problem  in 
these countries is the depletion and pollution of groundwater reserves due to: 
•  a reduction in recharge rates as a result of the diversion of surface flows: 
•  increased runoff caused by deforestation; 
•  Illcrease  III  the  direct  depletion  of  groundwater  reserves  through  private 
tubewells. 
Worldwatch estimates that two thirds of all water extracted from rivers and acquifers is 
used for irrigation, and that in many areas water demand for irrigation is  significantly in 
excess of recharge rates.  In India, for example, water tables are  estimated to be falling 
by more than one metre  a year in Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Gujurat and Tamil 
Nadu (Worldwatch Institute, 1995). 
11 Aside from the depletion of groudwater, irrigation is also the main cause of salinisation 
of groundwater reserves, Other sources of groundwater pollution include applications 
of nitrogenous fertilisers. Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s fertilizer 
applications in Asia nearly doubled. By the early 1990s fertilizer use in Asia was still 
lower than in Europe, but was much higher than in any other region of the world, and 
was rising fast. A related set of problems derive from the application of pesticides. 
Applications of pesticides in most developing countries have been increasing faster than 
applications of fertlizers, and fa~ter than the increase in agricultural production. In 
South and East Asia pesticide applications increased during the 1970s and 1980s by 
around ten per cent a year. Since pesticide consumption in the high income countries 
has, like fertilizer consumption, flattened over the last decade, such markets are 
increasingly important to the pesticide industry.  By the early part of this decade, 
developing countries accounted for around a third of world exports of pesticides (World 
Resources Institute, 1994). 
Table  3 Water  availability  in  developing  countries,  1970-1992 
Total  Total  Annual  Per  Per capita  Sectoral withdrawal as a share 
annual  annual  w'drawal  capita  annual  of total water resources 
internal  water  as a share  annual  water  (percent) 
renew'bl  w'drawal  of total  internal  w'drawal 
water  (km')  water  renew'bl  (m') 
resources  resources  water 
(km')  (percent)  resources 
~m') 
Agri- Dom- Ind-
culture  estic  ustry 
Sub-Saharan  3,713  55  7,488  140  88  8  3 
Africa 
East Asia &  7.915  631  8  5.009  453  86  6  8 
Pacific 
Snuth Asia  4.895  569  12  4.236  652  94  2  3 
Europe  574  110  19  2.865  589  45  14  42 
Middle East  276  202  73  1.071  1.003  89  6  5 
&  N.  Africa 
L.  America  10.579  173  2  24.390  460  72  16  11 
& Caribbean 
Other  4,486  375  8  13.976  1.324  66  6  28 
Economies 
Source: The World Bank. World Development Report 1992 
12 l 
The proxy for water pollution used here is the percentage of the total population with 
without access to safe water supplies as reported in both the World Development and 
Human n~velopment  Reports. This indicator is useful in capturing both the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of water supplies. 
Deforestation and desertification 
At a regional scale, deforestation, desertification and water depletion tend to be linked 
with  the  expansion  of agricultural  output  and  employment,  and  so  are  particularly 
associated with economies  in  which a high  proportion of output and/or employment 
derive from the agricultural sector. In addition, environmental problems associated with 
agricultural  growth  at  the  extensive  margin  tend  to  be  found  in  regions  with  low 
population density but high population growth (Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America) 
whilst those linked with agricultural growth at the intensive margin would be found in 
the regions with high rural population density and growth (South Asia and South East 
Asia). To some extent this is supported by the data. However, as  the productivity gains 
of agricultural intensification have faltered in Asia,  so  pressure in that region has gone 
back on to  remaining  forested  areas,  and recent rates  of deforestation  are  higher  in 
South and East Asia than elsewhere. 
Table 4 illustrates the extent of the problem of deforestation in selected sub-regions for 
the period 1981-1990.  It shows that not only did the rate of forest loss accelerate in 
regions where the process was already under way at the beginning of the decade, but 
that afforestation turned to deforestation in other regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa the 
highest rates of forest loss occurred in West Africa--Ghana, Togo in particular.  But 
note that the annual rate of loss in these countries, 1.3 to 1.4 per cent, was still very 
low compared to other regions where the forest stock is more depleted.  Four countries 
in Latin America - Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay - were 
converting remaining forests at more than 2 per cent a year during the 1980s, while 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines were all converting what is left of 
their forest resources at 2.9 to 3.0 per cent  a year. 
The  analogue  to  deforestation  in  arid,  semi-arid  and  dry  sub-humid  areas  is 
desertification.  Like deforestation, desertification implies a reduction in the vegetative 
cover of land, and tends to  be associated with the  expansion of agricultural output.  It 
may  be  associated with irrigated  crops,  rainfed  crops  or  livestock  production.  The 
nature of land degradation is  different in  each case.  At  present it  is  thought to  affect 
approximately a quarter of the total land area of the globe  (some  3.6  billion  hectares) 
and  approximately  a  sixth  of the  world's  population  (some  900  million  people). 
13 Estimates of the  extent of the  problem in  in  the  early  1990s  showed that it  was,  if 
anything, more extensive a problem than deforestation (see Table 5), 
Table  4  Forests  Resources  and  Deforestation,  1980-1990 
Extent of Natural  Annual  Deforestation 
Forest  (1981-1990) 
(1000  Ha) 
1980  1990  (1 ()()() hal  (percent) 
West SaheLian Africa  43,720  40,768  295  0,7 
East Sahelian Africa  71 ,395  65,450  595  0,8 
West Africa  61,520  55,607  591  1.0 
Central Africa  215,503  204,112  1,140  0,5 
Tropical SOllthern Africa  159,322  145,868  1,345  0,8 
InsuLar Africa  17,128  15,782  135  0,8 
South Asia  69,442  63,931  551  0,8 
Continental South Asia  88,377  75,240  1,314  1.5 
Insular South East Asia  154,687  135,426  1,926  1.2 
Central America and Mexico  79,216  68,096  1,112  1.4 
Caribbean Subregion  48,333  47,115  122  0,3 
Tropical South America  864,639  802,904  6,174  0,7 
Sources: The World Resource Institute 1994. World Resources 1994-1995. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
The nature of land degradation is different in each case, In irrigated lands, for example, 
the problems centre on salinisation and a1kalinisation, Annual losses due to these causes 
in the early years of this decade were running at about  1,5  million ha,  In rain-fed crop 
lands the dominant manifestation of land degradation is soil erosion and the loss of soil 
organisms,  which  account  for  at  least  3,5  million  ha  annually,  In  rangelands  the 
problem is  both much  more  severe  and  much  more extensive,  Degradation takes  the 
form of loss or alteration of vegetation, loss of soil  moisture  and  soil  organisms  and 
soil erosion,  Annual losses at the beginning of the decade were estimated to be between 
4.5 and 5.8 million ha (Tolba et ai,  1992). 
While  the  dominant  cause  of  both  deforestation  and  desertification  is  land  use 
conversion and  intensification,  in  many countires  fueldwood  scarcity  is  a  significant 
part of the  problem. The  scarcity of fuelwood  has  been  identified  as a  problem not 
because there are no substitutes, but because it bears most heavily on those sections of 
14 the  population who are least able  to  invest in  stoves  that  will  accept  alternative  fuels. 
Moreover,  projections by  the  same  SOurce  of the  size  of the  population expected  to 
experience  fuel wood  deficit  in  the  year  2000  indicated  that  it  is  a  peculiarly  rural 
problem. 
Table  5  Extent of Desertification of Drylands 
Moderately, severely and very severely desertitied land 
Irrigated areas  Rain-fed croplands  Rangelands 
(000 hal  per cent  (000 hal  per cent  (000 hal  per cenl 
Africa  1902  18  48863  61  995080  74 
Asia  31813  35  122284  56  1187610  75 
Australia  250  13  14320  34  361350  55 
Europe  1905  16  11854  54  80517  72 
N.  America  5860  28  11611  16  411154  75 
S.  America.  1517  17  6635  31  297754  76 
Sources:  Tolba M.K.  and  EI-Kho1y  O.A.  (eds).  1992.  The  World  Environment  1972-1992:  Two 
Decades of Challenge. UNEP. Chapman and Hall, London.: 137-139. 
The indicator of deforestation used here is the percentage change in forest cover during 
the 1980s. The sources are World Resources Institute (1992). This indicator is, if 
anything, even more sensitive to the environmental reference point (the proportion of 
forest cover remaining. Nevertheless, this paper reports the deforestation models to 
ensure comparability with the literature. The data set is that used by Panayotou (1993; 
1995). 
Sukphur dioxide and carbon dioxide 
The proxy for industrial emissions, S02' was selected partly because it  is  the  indicator 
most widely  used in  empirical studies  of the  relation between economic  growth  and 
environmental change, and partly because it is  so  closely associated with a wide range 
of other industrial  emissions  including  CO2,  In  the  developing  countries,  industrial 
growth depends to a large extent on the activities of small and medium scale enterprises 
(SMEs which tend to  be concentrated in the most environmentally damaging  activities 
- chemicals, textiles,  leather and  fur  products,  food  processing,  non-ferrous  metal 
work, charcoal and fuel wood supply.  Of these, textiles and non-ferrous metals are the 
15 main sources of SO, pollution. But both industries are major sources of range of typical 
industrial pollutants. 
In  textiles,  for  example,  SO,  emissions  are  associated  with  particulates  and 
hydrocarbon  emissions  to  air,  and  BOD,  suspended  solids,  salts,  toxic  metals  and 
sulphate  emissions  to  water.  In  the  non-ferrous  metals  industry,  SO, emissions  are 
associated with fluoride and carbon monoxide emissions to air, and fluorine, solids and 
hydrocarbon emissions to water and land.  In other major sources of SO"  the iron and 
steel and petrochemical industries, the  story is similar. SO, is  associated  with  nitrous 
oxide,  carbon  monoxide,  hydrogen  sulphide  and  'acid  mists',  along  with  BOD, 
suspended  solids,  oils,  metals,  acids,  phenols,  sulphides,  sulphates,  anunonia, 
cyanides, and effluents from wet gas scrubbers. 
The point has already been made (Table 2)  that  production  of these  commodities  has 
been  shifting  into  the  developing  countries,  and  hence  that  their  share  of  global 
emissions of these industrial pollutants has been rising. Many of the consequences of 
industrial emissions are localised and reflect the fact that the disposal of acids,  various 
heavy metals, solvents, cadmium, chromium, inks and dyes, catalysts and oil residues 
is largely unregulated. Indeed, most hazardous waste is  simply dumped in  landfills or 
disposed of in drains, both options resulting in the contamination of surface and ground 
water (Tolba et aI,  1992). 
In Viet N am, for  instance, there is no  wastewater treatment plant in any urban area in 
the country.  Most wastewater tends to be discharged directly  into  rivers,  canals  and 
lakes. Since  the  National  Environmental  Authority  has  yet  to  draw up  standards  for 
industrial emissions  to  air or water,  most industries  continue  to  discharge  untreated 
waste directly into the same rivers, canals or ponds.  In  Hanoi,  for example, less than 
20 per cent of industrial solid waste is disposed of in solid waste facilities.  Moreover, 
such  facilities  as  do exist  are  simply  dump sites  with  no  lining,  no  cover,  and  no 
leachate  or  methane  collection  and  treatment.  As  with  pesticides  of  high  residual 
toxicity, the effects of industrial waste disposal tend to be more persistent. They include 
the  build  up  of  toxins  in  river  sediment,  in  groundwater,  in  ecological  systems 
supported or impacted by the water source, and in human users. 
It has been remarked that CO2 emissions are linked to deforestation. However, it is only 
Africa and Latin America that land use change is responsible for a significant proportion 
of  total  carbon  emissions.  In  general,  industrial  sources  account  for  the  major 
proportion of IOtal emissions (Table 6). The dominant sources of carbon emissions are 
industrial users in East Asia, the former Soviet countries, the USA and Europe. Table 6 
16 indicates the  1991  pattern of energy consumption, and the  growth in  per capita terms 
over the preceding twenty years. Aside from South America, where growth in energy 
consumption  has  been  most  rapid,  it  is  interesting  that  the  fastest  increases  In 
commercial energy consumption have occurred in the high income economies. 
Table 6  Energy  consumption  and  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  1991 
Commercial  Energy  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions 
Consumption 
Total  Per Capita  Carbon Dioxide  Methane  CFCs 
Emissions 
........................ .............................................................. ................ "",  ... " ................  " ........ ,, .........................  , .... " ....................... "" ................................. 
petajoules  change  gigajoules  change  from  from  from  (million 
since  since  industry  land-use  anthro- tons) 
1971  1971  (million  change  pogenic 
(percent)  (percent) 
tons)  (million  sources 
tons)  (million 
tons) 
................................................. ..................  .... , ............. ...................  ................... ........................ ....................... 
Afi'icu  7.871  121  12  24  671.6  640  16 
Asia  80.374  238  25  129  6,671.5  920  120 
S.America  9.493  1,304  32  818  594.9  1,600  18 
Ex  USSR  54,730  68  193  42  3,581.1  28 
NIC America  96,086  430  243  300  5,764.3  190  36 
Europe  68.507  163  134  142  4,133.7  29 
Oceania  4,367  183  161  106  288.7  29  6 
Source: The World Resource Institute. World Resources 1994-1995. 
The indicators of sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide used here are 1990 per capita kg 
of SO, and CO, reported in UNEP (1994). SO, data are government estimates except 
for Asian country estimates which derive from  Kato and Akimoto (1992). CO, data are 
based on UNSO consumption data for gas, liquid and solid fuels, and cement 
manufacture (CDIAC 1992). 
3.2  Country-specific  variables 
The  country -specific  variables  selected  reflect  the  stylized  facts  that  lie  behind  the 
propositions of the Brundtland Report and Agenda 21.  The first of these  relate  to  the 
role  of  population  growth,  rural  employment,  agriculture  and  deforestation.  The 
conversion of land  to  agriculture  and  the  intensification of agriculture  in  developing 
countries-the  proximate  causes  of  deforestation  and  carbon  emissions  in  many 








6 landlessness, and rural poverty, The !FAD review of the  position as  it was  in  the late 
1980s  is  described  in  Table  8,  Inspection  reveals  an  obvious  linkage  between  the 
proportion of the population in agriculture, the level of rural poverty, and the existence 
of non-faIm rural employment opportunities, In Sub-Saharan Africa a large proportion 
of the  population  is  dependent on  agricultural  activity.  But with  few  non-farm rural 
employment opportunities the incidence of rural  poverty is  high.  In Asia, although the 
proportion in  agriculture is similar, rural  industrialisation has created more alternatives 
to agriculture in a number of countries, and there  are more wage earning opportunities 
in  agriculture  for  the  landless.  This  is  reflected  in  a  lower  proportion  of the  rural 
population  in  poverty.  The  pattern  in  Latin  America  is  different.  Not  only  is  the 
proportion of the economically active  population engaged in  agriculture  much  lower, 
but the proportion of the agricultural labour force in wage employment is much higher. 
Table 8  Profile of rural population  in  developing  countries,  1988 
Rural  Per cent of  Agricul- Population  Landless  Refugee 
population  total  tural  below the  population  population 
(millions)  population  popUlation  poverty 
per cent of  line per 
per cent of  per cent of 
rural  rural 
rural  cent of  population  population 
population  rural 
population 
Asia  2019  74  83  31  26  5 
Asia (extllding  567  70  74  46  20  5 
China and India) 
Sub-Saharan  337  73  98  60  II  6 
Afik'(l 
Near Easy & N.  106  51  73  26  23  13 
Ajh'ca 
L.  America &  123  29  96  61  31 
Caribbean 
Least DeveLoped  368  80  89  69  18  7 
Countries 
Source:  Jazairy I, Almagir M., and Panuccio T.  (1992)  The State of World Rural Poverty, IT 
Publications for IFAD, London. 
Conversion of forest land to agriculture is generally due to the actions of large numbers 
of usually-landless individuals encouraged by policies which have the effect of reducing 
the private cost of land conversion. While these actions are often independent, they may 
also ret1cct government policy. Two examples illustrate the connection. 
In the Philippines, the rapid increase in the  population in  the  upland areas is associated 
with high rates  of deforestation  in  those  areas.  The  increase  in  upland population  is 
18 almost all due to migration from the lowlands.  Sixty per cent of all upland migrants in 
the mid 1980s were landless. As  elsewhere. it is  argued that migration into the upland 
nrcas  h,,, heen  facilitated by  a road  network constructed  to  support the  expansion of 
limber  production.  and  a  government  resettlement  programme  (W-orld  Resources 
Institute.  1994). 
In  outer islands of Indonesia-Sumatra. Kalimantan, Maluku and Irian  Jaya-include 
some of the  largest remaining tropical forests. The resettlement programme known  as 
the transmigration, moved some 3.7 million people from the most populated islands of 
Java and  Bali  to  the  outer islands  in  the  1960s,  1970s  and  1980s.  In  most  cases, 
migrants  were  settled  in  what  were  termed  conversion  forests.  The  environmental 
consequences of this policy have been significant. New roads have again  been the  spur 
to private expansion into the conversion forests. The increasing density of popUlation in 
these  forests  has,  in turn,  changed both  the  area  and  pattern  of shifting  cultivation 
followed by indigenous people. Indeed, by the late 1980s some 34% of the conversion 
forest was affected by shifting cultivation. 
It is difficult to identify country-specific variables that adequately capture these stylized 
facts.  In  this paper the  country-specific variables  selected  are  population  growth;  the 
proportion of the population in the rural areas; and agriculture's share of GOP. 
The second set of stylised facts  relate to the way in which countries are  integrated into 
the global economy. In very many cases the driving forces  behind the impoverishment 
of  rural  migrants  include  international  market  trends.  Under  the  'Brundtland 
hypothesis' countries locked in to products  for  which the  terms  of trade  decline  will 
tend to  increase exports of those products just to  maintain  foreign  exchange earnings 
(Pearce and Warford, 1993). The response to  falling real primary commodity prices in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, appears to have been consistent with this hypothesis. 
The  characteristic  features  of many  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  are  low  income, 
primary  product  dependence  and  indebtedness.  Per  capita  income  and  the  external 
indebtedness of these countries have both deteriorated over the last decade as  primary 
commodity  prices  have  followed  a  downward  trend.  The  barter  terms  of trade  of 
countries in the region show a secular decline over the last three decades (World Bank, 
1996).  Yet  both  primary  commodity  production  and  the  volume  of  exports  bave 
increased. 
The longer-term impacts of the Uruguay Round are  also thought to  involve substantial 
downside risks for Sub-Saharan  Africa.  During  the  period  1983-93  the World Bank 
estimates that per capita consumption and GOP declined at,  respectively,  1.8  and  0.8 
19 per cent per year in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank,  1994).  The Uruguay Round is 
expected to  have  two  effects  which  could  cause  this  trend  to  continue.  First,  it  is 
expected  to  raise  international  food  prices.  This  will  adversely  effect  the  balance  of 
payments of net food importers and put further downward pressure on the real incomes 
of the poor. Second, countries which have historically benefitted from the terms of the 
Lome Convention will lose their preferential access to  European markets. Indeed, Sub-
Saharan  Africa  is  the  one  region  where  the  poor  are  expected  to  increase  both 
numerically and as a proportion of the population (World Bank, 1994). 
This contradicts the World Bank's view that economic liberalisation will, in general, be 
beneficial to the environment. Munasinghe and Cruz (1995) argue that: 
•  The removal  of market price  distortions  such  as  agricultural  or energy subsidies 
improves both the efficiency of economic activity,  and  reduces  the  impact of that 
activity on the environment. 
•  Improving the  security of land tenure  by assigning private  property  or use  rights 
promotes investment in land conservation and environmental stewardship. 
•  Enhancing  macroeconomic  stability  also  encourages  investment,  and  persuades 
resource users to  to take a longer term view of their decisions. 
•  Economic liberalisation creates new economic opportunities.  To the  extent that this 
reduces poverty, it also reduces pressure on  SCarce but open-access .environmental 
resources 
Trade liberalisation  may  certainly  stimulate environmental  protection  by lowering  the 
cost of environmental protection (Anderson and Blackhurst,  1992).  But if it stimulates 
demand  for  the  products  of environmentally  damaging  activities,  it  will  increase 
environmental damage. The change in developing  country  share  in  world production 
and  trade  in  the  smoke-stack  industries  is,  for  example,  largely  a  result  of  the 
liberalisation of national and international market~. 
Many developing countries have undergone adjustments necessitated by acute fiscal and 
current  account  deficits  in  the  1980s.  The  nature  of the  adjustment  has  changed 
somewhat over the  years,  but  the  central  elements  remain  the  alignment of domestic 
prices with world prices through the elimination of distortionary  taxes,  subsidies  and 
administered  pricing  practices;  the  reduction  of public  expenditure;  deregulation  of 
industry; the imposition of wage restraints; institutional reforms; trade liberalisation; and 
the  privatisation  of  state-owned  assets.  Only  recently  have  structural  adjustment 
programmes begun to  take  any  account  of the  environment,  and  the  environmental 
20 impacts  of structural  adjustment programmes  begun  to  be  analysed  (Panayotou  and 
Hupe,  1995).  There are now  numerous examples of environmental degradation which 
can  be linked  to  structural  adjustment  policies  including  deforestation,  soil  erosion, 
destruction  of coastal  habitats  and  depletion  of fisheries  (Cruz  and  Repetto  1992; 
Hansen-Kuhn 1993; Panayotou and Hupe, 1995), 
The connection is  thought to be  the following.  Stimulation of export-oriented  primary 
commodity production increases  pressure on the  resource  base.  The  real  incomes  of 
consumers fall and there is disemployment in both the  public sector and a reduction in 
demand for domestically produced goods and services. This worsens fhe  condition of 
the poor and leads to  fhe  overexploitation of resources to which fhey  have access. The 
reduction in public expenditure programmes reduces the budgets of agencies protecting 
the environment. The reduction of credit to small rural investors leads to lower on-farm 
investments  and  declining  agricultural  yields,  countering  efforts  to  stabilize  fhe 
agricultural  frontier  (particularly  in  the  absence  of effective  land  tenure  systems). 
Deregulation makes it harder to correct price distortions in  fhe  forestry,  irrigation  and 
energy sectors. 
To capture the effect of dependence on world commodity markets the country-specific 
variables include a measure of the openness of the economy: exports as a proportion of 
GDP.  This is measured by the ratio of the value of exports of goods and services to 
GDP in  1990 (UNDP, 1992; World Bank, 1992).  Exports of goods and services is the 
market value of goods and services  provided to the rest of the world. It includes the 
value of merchandise, freight, insurance, travel and other non-factor services, but 
excludes transfer payments, investment income, interest and labour income. It also 
excludes trans boundary environmental externalities. 
3.3  The  economic  and  social perfomance  measures 
The performance indicators selected all involve some modificaton to the per capita 
income measures used in the existing EKC literature.  To test the relation between 
environmental and economic performance in a way which sheds light on the 
propositions of the Brundtland Report and Agenda 21, we need to capture the effects of 
differences in levels not just of income, but also of consumption, poverty and a broader 
measure of development.  Aside from per capita GDP in Purchasing Power Parity 
tenDs. there are three different models for each environmental effect comprising: private 
and government consumption per capita; an IF  AD index of rural poverty in the 
developing countries; and the Human Development Index. 
21 Consumption is measured by the sum of private and general government consumption 
in 1990 as reported in the Human Development and the World Development Reports 
(UNDP, 1992; World Bank, 1992), Private consumption is the market value of goods 
and services received by households and non-profit organisations, including imputed 
rents on owner-occupied dwellings. Government consumption is current expenditures 
on goods and services by national, state, provincial and local governments, but 
excluding state-owned enterprises. The measure of consumption used accordingly 
excludes and non-marketed environmental goods and service. 
Two measures of poverty have been selected for reporting.  The first is IFAD's 
Integrated Poverty Index (IPI) for 114 developing countries. Use of this measure 
truncates the sample of countries, and this needs to be born in mind in interpreting the 
results. The IPI is based on Sen's composite poverty index (Sen 1976). It has been 
adjusted for purposes of this exercise to take values between 0 and 100, and is 
increasing in poverty. That is, the closer to  100 the more impoverished is the country. 
The second is the IFAD's Relative Welfare Index (RWI).  This is the arithmetic mean 
ofthree other idices: the IPI, and index of food security, and an index of basic needs. A 
third measure was estimated-proportion of the rural population below the poverty line 
(PBPL).  But this performed least well, and is not reported. 
The IPI is calculated by combining a head count index of poverty, the income gap ratio, 
life expectancy at birth, and the annual rate of growth of per capita GNP. The head 
count index is simply the percentage of the population below the poverty line.  The 
income gap ratio is the difference between the highest per capita GNP in the sample and 
the per capita GNP of the country concerned, expressed as a percentage of the former. 
Life expectancy at birth is included as a proxy for income distribution below the poverty 
line.  Using this measure it is possible to classify countries into three broad groups. An 
IPI of 40 or less indicates severe poverty; and IPI between 40 and 20 indicates 
moderate poverty; while an IPI of less than 20 indicates little poverty.  The IPI used 
here was developed on the basis of data for a number of different years, but notionally 
describes the situation in 1988. 
The R  WI includes the elements of the IPI, plus a set of food production and 
consumption variables, an index of educational attainment and an index of health status. 
The educational index includes adult literacy and primary school enrolment.  The health 
index includes population per physician, infant mortality, and access to health services, 
safe water and sanitation.  The RWI is normalised to take values between zero and one. 
22 Finally, the HDI has been selected as the most general and widely accepted index of 
development The version used here is not adjusted for income distribution, and so 
combines GDP per capita in PPP$; life expectancy at birth; and educational 
attainment-the latter measured by a combination of adult literacy and primary, 
secondary and tertiary education enrolment ratios. Once again, for comparability, the 
HDI used is for  1990. 
3. 4  The  results 
This background helps to explain the differences that emerge in the relation between our 
environmental indicators and the selected measures of development and economic 
performance. The data used in this analysis are described and reported in Appendix A. 
In all cases they have been selected so as to correspond as closely as possible with the 
data used in the main published studies of the relation between economic and 
environmental change. The same holds for the method of analysis. 
The analysis of the relaionship between economic  growth and pollution  carried  out by 
Grossman  and  Krueger (1991,1995),  Shafik and Bandyopadhyay  (1992),  Selden  and 
Song (1994)  and Hohz-Eaking  and Selden  (1995)  used pooed cross-country  and time 
seres data for regressing some mem,ure  of environmental  emissions/degradaion  against 
income  and  a  set  of  exogenous  faclDrs.  That  is,  the  growth-environmental  quality 
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error term 
The environmental and performance indicators have already  been  identified.  They  are 
described in Appendix A. The environmental performance indicators are denoted ACH20 
(safe water), 502 (enllisions of sulphur), C02 (enllisions of carbon dioxide),  and DEF 
(deforestation). The economic/social  performance indicators  are  denoted  INCCME  (real 
23 gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity  term),  CONSUMPTION 
(per capita consumption), HOI (the human development index) or DHOI (the dislribution-
adjusted human development index),  and IPI (the integrated poverty index).  The country 
'peciric  variables  are  denoted POPG  (the rate  of population growth),  RUPCP  (rural 
population  as  a  pera;ntage of total  population),  AGSHARE  (agri:ultural  GDP  as  a 
pera;ntage of total GDP),  and EXPSHA (exports of goods  and non-factor services  as  a 
pera;ntage of GDP). 
The estimated results for all models are given in Appendix B. The results for each of the 
four environmental indicators are summarised below: 
Polluted water supplies (lack of  access to clean water supplies) 
Lack of access to clean water supplies is shown to decline monotonically with growth 
in income, the HDI and consumption. The best fit is given by linear models including 
the country-specific variables, population growth and the share of rural population. That 
is, rapidly growing rural populations are most cbsely a%ociaed with lack of aca;ss to 
safe water. Differences in the coefficients on income, consumption and the HDI show 
that the latter has the weaker effect, although it is in the same direction as the first two. 
This reflects the fact that where per capita GDP and educational attainment-both 
elements of the HDI-may be expected to vary directly with lack of access to safe 
water, the life expectancy element in the HDI will do the opposite. 
The relation between access to safe water and the Integrated Poverty Index, IPI, is less 
significant. The poverty index involves a truncated sample since it was calculated for 
low and middle income countries only. While the IPI model has less explanatory power 
than the others, it does indicate that lack of access to safe water is an increasing function 
of poverty. In addition to the IPI, the model includes the effects of population growth 
and rural population share.  Both effects are positive and significant. Population growth 
is, however, the more important explanator of the two. As with GDP, 
CONS UMPTION and INCOME, a linear model gives the best fit. The implication is 
that access to clean water does not involve a Kuznet's relation with any of the criteria of 
human development. While the factors assessed may not explain a great deal of the 
variation in access to safe water, some models perform better than others. Use of the 
Relative Welfare Index, RWI, instead of the IPI improves the model fit slightly. 
Sulphur dioxide 
24 Sulphur dioxide emissions have been the most studied pollutant in the EKe literature. It 
is already well understood that S02 bears a Kuznets type relation with per capita 
income. It turns out that S02 bears the same relation to consumption. The best fit is 
offered by a quadratic specification of the model in both cases. As with lack of access to 
clean water supplies, the consumption model has less explanatory power than the 
income model. It may be inferred that the inclusion of information on 
savings/investment improves the explanatory power of the model. This is consistent 
with the fact that the primary sources of emissions are industrial activities, and 
especially power generation, ferrous and non-ferrous metals and petrochemicals. 
The turning points for income are in the range 7359 PPP$-9563 PPP$ while those for 
consumption are 639IPPP$-7239PPP$. Given the distribution of income and 
consumption (see Appendix A) this puts a country like Portugal at the tumng point. It 
also makes it easy to see how many countries are below the turning point. For all such 
countries growth in either income or consumption will be associated with rising per 
capita sulphur emissions, and hence an increasing burden on the assimilative capacity of 
the environment.. 
Although quadratic models are reported for HDI and NHDI, they do not clearly 
dominate the linear models. That is, although the relation between sulphur emissions 
and the two human development indicators is consistent with at least a segment of the 
inverted U, a linear model performs just as well. One limitation of the sulphur models is 
that the sample size is smaller than for the other environmental indicators. There are data 
for about 60 countries for the income and HDI models, and only 43 for the 
consumption model. Part of the difference in the explanatory power of the models may 
be due to this. The sample size for the IPI model is only 18. The results from that 
model have not therefore been reported.  For similar reasons, the results of the RWI 
model have not been reported. 
Deforestation 
Of all the environmental indicators investigated to date, most difficulty in fitting 
deforestation and income data to quadratic models. Although Panayotou (1993, 1995) 
reports a Kuznets relation between deforestation and per capita income, although the 
relation is much weaker than for S02' It is also clear that there is less obvious sense in 
taking the rate of deforestation as the relevant indicator, since it is so sensitive to the 
proportion of the forest remaining. 
25 Using the same data set as Panayotou, there is no evidence for a Kuznets relation when 
the whole sample is considered. There is some limited support for a Kuznets relation 
between deforestation and three measures of  performance-income, consumption and 
the HOI-when only tropical countries are considered. But none of models has much 
explanatory power. There is no statisically significant relation between the poverty 
index, IPI, or the relative welfare index, RWI, and deforestation. The only country-
specific variable that is a significant in any of the models is the rural population as a 
proportion of the total population. 
Carbon dioxide 
Carbon emissions increase monotonically with per capita GOP, consumption and the 
measures of human development used, and decrease monotonically with poverty. The 
best fit in all cases is offered by a linear model. In all cases C02 emissions increase 
with the three development measures over the whole income range. This is exactly 
opposite to the case of water pollution. Water pollution was found to decrease over the 
whole of the income range. 
The most significant of the country-specific variables is the share of agriculture in GOP, 
the coefficients reflecting the fact that C02 emissions increase with manufacturing and 
industrial activity and fall with agricultural activity. The higher the agricultural share in 
GOP, the lower the share of manufacturing and industrial activities that generate carbon 
emissions. The results of a model including our index of the openness of the economy, 
the share of exports in GOP, are also reported though they are (a) not significant in all 
cases and (b) do not add much explanatory power to the regressions. In one case-
when the economic performance indicator is consumption-the openness of the 
economy does turn out to be significant. Carbon emissions are an increasing function of 
both consumption and the share of exports in GOP. 
Since they exclude many of the major sources of carbon emissions, the poverty models 
are weaker than the other models. The IPI model indicates a negative relation between 
the [PI and carbon emissions that is statistically significant, but not very strong. The 
RWI model, on the other hand, shows a postive (but also very weak relation) between 
the R  WI and carbon emissions. Both confirm that the relation between the share of 
agriculture in GOP and carbon emissions is negative. Although forest conversion is 
usually driven by the expansion of agriculture, this relfects the fact that the role of land 
conversion in generating carbon emissions in low income countries is dominated by the 
effect of industrial emissions in middle and high income countries. 
26 4 .  Environmental  quality,  patterns  of consumption  and  human 
development 
This brings us back to our starting point: the proposition that environmental degradation 
is  driven  both by  poverty  in  the  developing  world  and  by  overconsumption  in  the 
developed world. How does this proposition fare in the face of fhe  evidence? Since the 
general inverted-U shaped relation between per capita income and various indicators of 
environmental quality holds for at least some environmental indicators for measures of 
income, consumption and human development, the answer appears to be ambiguous. 
Measured in per capita terms, some of the environmental impacts of economic activities 
appear to  be  least severe  at  either end of the  income  range,  and most  severe  in  the 
middle.  But it  is  worth recalling  (a)  that  the  resnlts have  been  developed for  single 
equation models based on cross-sectional data that assume away any feedbacks between 
environment and economy; and (b)  that the measure of environmental quality tends  to 
be a per capita measure of outputs (emissions). It tends not to  aggregate emissions, or 
the  volume  of such emissions  relative  to  the  assimilative  or  carrying capacity of the 
ecosystem concerned. In some cases it is a measure of ambient concentrations, but this 
is still unrelated to the carrying or assimilative capacity of the affected system.  Recall. 
in addition, that the EKC is well defined for one environmental indicator only-sulphur 
dioxide. There is no EKC for the lack of access to clean water at one end or CO, at  the 
other; the  best fit  in  fhe  deforestation models is quadratic, but the models do not have 
much explanatory power. 
The  most compelling  explanation for  the  differences  found  in both  the  shape  of the 
curve  relating environmental  and  development  indicators  is  fhat  the  four  classes  of 
environmental problem evaluated typically impose costs at very different temporal and 
spatial scales. The lack of access to clean water imposes costs fhat are  immediate  and 
very  local  in  their effect.  People who do not  have  access  to  clean  water  suffer  an 
increased incidence in  a range of gastro-intestinal and skin diseases.  Infant mortality 
tends to be much higher, and life  expectancy  is  much lower.  Productivity  and hence 
consumption is also much lower. Put another way, the pollution of local water supplies 
reduces  the  quality  of life  of the  people  who  use  those  supplies  as  they  use  it. 
Emissions  of SO"  by  contrast,  have  more  diffuse effects.  In  Europe,  for  example, 
acidic deposition due to  SO, emissions is recognised to be  a European-wide problem. 
Emissions from thermal power generating plants in Britain, for  instance, lead to  'acid 
rain' in  Scandinavia, Germany, Poland, fhe  Czech Republic and other countries.  Nor 
are  the effects as immediate.  Increasing acidification  of soils  and water reduces  their 
27 productivity--eventually.  Acidic  deposition  on  buildings  increases  the  rate  at  which 
stone and  metal  corrodes,  and so  reduces  their  working  life.  Both impose very  real 
costs on society, but the costs are delayed. 
Deforestation and CO, emissions are at the other end of fhe  spectrum from pollution of 
local water supplies. They are linked in the sense fhat  land conversion (the burning of 
forests) is one source of CO2•  But they are also linked in that both involve  long-term 
global effects. Deforestation is recognised to be a major factor in biodiversity loss. The 
destruction of habitats in areas of high species richness and high levels of endemism is 
the  main  proximate cause  of species extinctions  (Heywood  1995).  All  of humanity 
loses from the loss of information and evolutionary potential that implies (Perrings et al, 
1995).  Similarly, CO2 is  fhe  main proximate cause of global  climate  change.  Climate 
change is a process fraught with uncertainty, but is expected to  impose very significant 
adjustment costs on socities and ecosystems alike  across fhe  globe  (IPCC  1996).  Of 
course deforestation  has  other more localised effects.  It involves  loss  of watershed 
protection and hence increased soil erosion and siltation of rivers  and  reservoirs.  But 
these effects are still imposed on people other than those engaged in land conversion. 
People are more concerned about the short term environmental impacts of  economic 
activity in their own neighbourhood than they are about long term impacts occurring at 
geographically distant locations. The meawre of their concern for the wellbeing of 
future generations or those who live far away-the rate at which they discount future 
and distant costs-appears to be a function of per capita income. That is, the rate at 
which people discount the wider and future environmental costs of their actions appears 
to fall with income. Poverty induces people to behave as if they are myopic, while 
aft1uence allows people the lUXUry of 'caring' more about both future generations and 
distant members of the present generation. 
The common intuition behind this is straightforward. If  people are impoverished by the 
imposition of charges for environmental resources, they will focus their attention on 
'free' or open access resources, and their decisions will become increasingly myopic. 
The economic intuition is equally plain. A change in fhe relative prices involves both 
substitution and income effects. For the poor, the income effects of price changes tend 
to be very strong. They may also be perverse. An increase in the price of a resource 
reduces the real income of the user. For a large class of resources (inferior goods) a 
reduction in the real income of users induces an increase demand for the resource. In 
the extreme case (Giffin goods) an increase in the price of the good induces people to 
buy more of that good. The existence of Giffin goods is evidence of a form of poverty 
trap. 
28 One implication of this is that where income effects come close to dominating 
substitutinn effects, as is likely for many marginal environmental resources, there is a 
real risk that market based incentives may not work or may work in the 'wrong' 
direction, Price changes that cause farmer incomes to fall are a case in point If farmers 
increase output to compensate for the reduction in their income, the envirorunental 
consequences of the price change may be perverse, Put another way, the effectiveness 
of economic incentives designed to assure the environmentally sustainable use of 
resources in developing countries will be weakened by any policy that deepens and 
widens poverty in those countries, 
More generally, the Brundtland perception  of the  relation  between poverty,  affluence 
and the environment has been illuminated by the hunt for  a Kuznets relation between 
per capita income and environmental quality, The EKC studies have shown that deeping 
poverty  at  one  end  of the  scale,  and  increasing  affluence  at  the  other,  both  have 
implications for the environment But the results are not nearly ass strong as Brundtland 
suggested, Deepening poverty is associated with environmental effects that tend to  have 
immediate  and  local  implications  for  the  health  and  welfare  of  the  communities 
concerned,  Increasing  affluence  is  associated  with  envirorunental  effects  which  are 
much more widespread and much longer-lasting, 
It also  shows  that  these  are  part  of  a  continuum  of effects,  The  environmental 
consequences of economic  activity  are  generally  quite  specific  to  the  nature  of the 
activity, and the type of economic activity tends to be correlated with income, It is not at 
all  surprising, therefore, that the distribution of environmental effects  associated  with 
given activities may be mapped into the income range associated with those  activities, 
The optimistic conclusion drawn from this by at least some-that economic growth will 
'take  care'  of  the  environment-is,  however,  unwarranted,  The  environmental 
consequences  of  economic  growth  may  be  expected  to  change  as  the  activities 
supporting growth changes,  Each  new  wave  of activities  will  have  its  own  set  of 
effects. There is  not much that can be said about general trends, except that results of 
the  EKC studies lend some support to  the view that more affluent societies will avoid 
activities  with  significant  local  or  short-term  effects.  Hence  the  environmental 
consequences of growth  in  higher income countries  will  tend  to  be displaced  on  to 
others--either geographically distant members of the present generation or members of 
future generations. 
Historically, environmental improvement has followed specific institutional reforms, 
environmental legislation and market-based incentives designed to internalise harmful 
29 external effects.  It has also been limited to cases where societies have a direct incentive 
to intcrnalise the environmental costs of their own activity. Where the environmental 
costs of economic activity have been born by the poor, by future generations, or by 
people in other countries, the incentive to address environmental questions has been 
much weaker. 
In the light of this, we might ask what is learned by looking at the relation between 
environmental indicators and other measures of economic and social performance. 
Except in the case of lack of access to safe water supplies, both consumption and the 
two variants of the HDI have less explanatory power than GDP per capita. In all cases, 
however, the difference in the explanatory power of the income and consumption 
models is marginal. The results of the models for the two variants of the HDI-the HDI 
and the income distribution-adjusted HDI-show that addition of an implicit 
distribution variable slightly improves the explanatory power of the models for sulphur, 
carbon and deforestation (bearing in mind the weakness of the latter model). On the 
other hand it slightly worsens the explanatory power of the model for access to safe 
water. 
The only substantial difference is between the models using alternative development 
indicators and the models using the IPI and the RWI. These measures of performance 
turn out to have much weaker explanatory power than the others.  Poverty is not as 
good a predictor of environmental quality as the other measures of performance. The 
poverty data set is, of course, truncated, but even if the same sample of countries is 
used in the models for the other performance indicators, the poverty models have least 
explanatory power.  This is true even for lack of access to safe water which we might 
expect to be closely correlated with an index that includes the proportion of the rural 
population below the poverty line. Bearing in mind, however, that the environmental 
indicators tested are associated with particular patterns of consumption or particular 
productive activities, all this indicates is that the IPI, the RWI and (even less the 
proportion of the population below the poverty line) are weaker predictors of 
consumption or production activities in low and middle income countries than the other 
performance measures. 
Finally, what is being said about either the environmental sustainability of consumption 
and production activities'?  Since  none  of the  environmental  indicators  measures  the 
volume of emissions, land use change, or access relative to  the assimilative or carrying 
capacity of the ecosystem concerned, the answer is  'not very much'. Arrow et al  (1995) 
argue that the interesting question about the link between growth, development and the 
environment is not whether economic growth does have environmental consequences. 
30 It  is  whether  its  environmental consequences  threaten  the  resilience  of the  ecological 
systems on which economic activities depend. To answer that question  requires  more 
than an index of the  level of pOllution or depletion, it requires an index of the level of 
pollution or depletion relative to the  assimilative or carrying capacity of the  ecological 
system  concerned.  As  Arrow  et  aI  (1995)  point  out,  the  EKe  is  evidence  that 
environmental improvements have occurred in some cases. It is  not evidence either that 
they  will  occur in  all  cases,  or  that  they  will  occur  in  time  to  avert  the  potentially 
irreversible environmental effects of economic or human development. 
31 APPENDIX  A 
TABLE A.I: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY INDICATORS 
COUNTRY  CO2  ACH20  DEF  S02 
AFGHANISTAN  0.1  21  3.9 
ALBANIA  0.82  97  0 
ALGERIA  0.74  71  0.8 
ANGOLA  0.14  40  0.7 
ANTIGUA & BARB.  1.08 
ARGENTINA  0.93  64  0.1 
AUSTRALIA  4.32  100  0 
AUSTRIA  I.  95  100  0.4  13.1 
BAHAMAS  1.44 
BAHRAIN  6.93 
BANGLADESH  0.04  78  4.1  0.5 
BARBADOS  1.08  100 
BELGIUM  2.87  100  -0.3  42.3 
BELIZE  0.37 
BENIN  0.04  55  1.3 
BHUTAN  0.02  34 
BOLIVIA  0.3  53  1.2 
BOTSWANA  0.36  90  0.5 
BRAZIL  0.13  87  0.6 
BRUNEI  5.34  4.4 
BULGARIA  2.76  99  -0.2  114.6 
BURKINA FASO  0.02  70  0.7 
BURUNDI  0.01  46  0.6 
.AMEROON  0.13  44  0.6 
AMBODIA  0.01  I  0.3 
ANADA  4.35  100  -1.1  143.3 
APE VERDE  0.06 
ENT. AFRICAN REP.  0.02  24  0.4 
HAD  0.01  57  0.7 
CHTLE  0.71  87  -0.1 
H1NA  1.86  72  0.7  17.7 
OLOMBIA  0.44  86  0.7 
OMOROS  0.03 
ONGO  0.24  38  0.2 
COSTA RICA  0.3  92  3 
-OTE D'IVORE  0.19  69  I 
k:UBA  0.9 
YPRUS  1.7  100 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  3.62  0.1  177.1 
DENMARK  2.71  100  0  52 
!DJIBOUTI  0.25 
DOMINICAN REP.  0.24  68  2.9 
ECUADOR  0.44  54  1.8 
EGYPT  0.42  90  0 
ELSALVADOR  0.13  47  2.3 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA  0.09 
ETHIOPIA  0.02  18  0.3 
FIJI  0.27  80 
ANLAND  2.82  96  0  51.5 
32 COUNTRY  CO2  ACH20  DEF  S02 
FRANCE  1.74  100  -0.1  21.5 
(JABON  \.45  66  0.6 
GAMBIA  0.06  77  0.8 
GERMAN OEM. REP.  5.05  314.9 
(,ERMAN FED. REP.  2.94  100  -0.4  16.6 
GHANA  0.07  57  1.4 
(;REECE  1.88  98  0  50.3 
GRENADA  0.38 
GUATEMALA  0.12  62  1.8 
GUINEA  0.05  52  1.2 
GUINEA-BISSAU  0.06  25  0.8 
HAITI  0.03  41  5.1 
HONDURAS  0.1  64  2.2 
HONG KONG  1.26  98  -0.5  25.9 
HUNGARY  1.49  98  -0.5  95.7 
ICELAND  0.15  100  24.8 
INDIA  0.22  73  0.6  3.7 
INDONESIA  0.21  34  1.1  2.7 
IRAN  0.9  89 
IRAQ  0.75  77 
IRELAND  2.27  100  -1.2  45.2 
ISRAEL  2.08  100  -0.3  58.6 
ITALY  1.82  100  a  42 
AMAleA  0.52  72  7.8 
APAN  2.34  96  0  9.2 
ORDAN  0.69  99  - I 
KENYA  0.07  49  0.6 
KOREA  1.54  93  0.1  7.9 
KOREA OEM.  I.  96  59.3 
KUWAIT  3.45  0  222.5 
LAOS  0.01  28  0.9  0.4 
LEBANON  0.93  0.6 
LESOTHO  47  0 
I'dBERIA  0.05  50 
LIBYA  2.57 
MADAGASCAR  0.02  21  0.8 
MALAWI  0.02  51  1.4 
MALAYSIA  0.9  78  2.1  14.7 
MALDIVES  1.5 
MALI  0.01  II  0.8 
MALTA  1.29  100 
MAURITANIA  0.35  66  0 
MAURl1lUS  0.29  95  0.2 
MEXICO  1.0 I  89  1.3 
MONGOLIA  1.26  80  0.9  49.4 
MOROCCO  0.25  56  -1.4 
MOZAMBIQUE  0.02  22  0.8 
MYANMAR  0.03  74  0.7 
NAMIBIA  0.3 
NEPAL  0.0 I  37  I  0.6 
NETIlERLANDS  2.54  100  -0.3  16.1 
NEW ZEALAND  2.07  97  0 
33 COUNTRY  CO2  ACH20  DEF  S02 
NICARAGUA  O. I 5  54  1.9 
NIGER  0.04  53  0.4 
NIGERIA  0.21  42  0.7 
NORWAY  2.48  100  -1.4  1.5 
)MAN  2.24  46  a 
PAKISTAN  0.14  55  3.5 
PANAMA  0.3  84  1.9 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  0.16  33  0.3 
PARAGUAY  0.09  35  2.8 
PERU  0.27  53  0.4 
PHILIPPINES  0.19  81  3.4  6 
POLAND  2.6  89  -0.1  83.5 
PORTUGAL  1.09  92  -0.5  20.6 
QATAR  10.47  430.8 
ROMANIA  2.12  95  a  45.6 
RWANDA  0.02  69  0.2 
ST KITTS & NEVIS  0.4 
STLUCIA  0.3 
ST VINCENTi GRANADINE  0.19 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE  0.15 
SAUDI ARABIA  3.64  93  0  99.2 
SENEGAL  0.1  44  0.7 
SEYCHELLES  0.66 
SIERRA LEONE  0.04  39  0.6 
SINGAPORE  3.77  100  2.3  51.7 
SOMALIA  0.03  36 
SOUTH AFRICA  2.15  -0.8 
SPAIN  I.  41  100  0  56.7 
SRI LANKA  0.06  60  1.4  1.7 
SUDAN  0.04  34 
SURINAlvIE  1.24  68 
SWAZILAND  U  31 
SWEDEN  1.6  100  0  24.5 
SWITZERLAND  1.72  100  -0.6  9.5 
SYRIA  0.66  79  -4.3 
ANZANIA  0.02  52  1.2 
HAILA..ND  0.46  77  3.5  11.2 
TOGO  0.05  70  l.S 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  3.19  96  -2.1 
UNISIA  0.34  70  -1.9 
URKEY  0.69  84  0  7.2 
UGANDA  0.08  33  I 
UAE  9.05  100  0 
UK  2.65  100  -1.1  66.3 
USSR  3.66  57.3 
ARMENIA  3.9  20.9 
AZERBAlJAr-<  1.3  12.4 
BELARUS  -0.4  54.6 
ESTONIA  -1.2  121.3 
GEORGIA  0.7  13.9 
KAZAKHSTA~  a  87 
KYRGYZSTAN  1.2  12.4 
34 COUNTRY  CO2  ACH20  DEF  S02 
ILATVIA  -0.2  20 
LIl1IUANIA  0  38 
MOUJOVA  -6.7  52.9 
[RUSSIA  0.2  68.2 
rrAJIKISTAN  3 
TURKMENISTAN  5.8 
UKRAINE  -0.3  53.3 
UZBEKISTAN  5.5  25.2 
USA  5.26  0.1  84.7 
URUGUAY  0.35  95  -0.6 
VANUATU  0.12 
VENEZUELA  1.4  92  1.2 
VIETNAM  0.1  1.5  0.6 
YEMEN  0.1 I  0 
YEMENPDR  0.64 
YUGOSLAVIA  1.5  62. I 
!ZAIRE  0.03  39 
[LAMBIA  0.08  59  1.1 
IZIMBABWE  0.71  84  1.7 
NOTES: 
Values for carbon dioxide (C02) give emissions from industrial sources in per capita  1990 
kg CO" as reported in the UNEP'  s Environmental Data Report 1993-94.  They are based 
on  UN  consumption data for  gas,  liquid  and solid  fuel;  plus  cement  manufacturing 
statistics to  which appropiate emission faclDrs  have been applied.  Per capita emissions are 
based on UN population statistics. Emissions of SO, are measured in  per capita 1990 kg 
of SO, and they are also reported in the UNEP's Environmental Data Report 1993-94. 
Access to drinking water (ACH20) is measured by access to water supplies through either 
standpost  or  home connections.  Safe water  is  defined  as  treaed  surface  waters  or 
untreated but uncontaminated waters.  These data are reported in the Human Development 
Report 1994.  Annual defores tation  rates  during the 1980s (DEF)  refers  to  the permanent 
conversion of forestland to  other uses.  Estimates of forest area are derived from country 
statistics assembled by  the FAO and the UNECE.  The data are reported in  the Human 
Development Report 1997. 
35 TABLE A 2' ECONOMIC/SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS  .. 
COUNTRY  INC  HDI  DHDI  RWI  IPI  CONS 
AFGHANISTAN  714  0.066  0.32  0.57 
ALBANIA  3000  0.699 
ALGERIA  3011  0.528  0.71  0.166  1866.82 
ANGOLA  840  0.143  0.41  0.596 
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA  4000  0.785  0.77  0.216 
ARGENTINA  4295  0.832  0.812  0.82  0.125  3607.8 
AUSTRALIA  16051  0.972  0.935  12680.29 
AUSlRlA  16504  0.952  12047.92 
BAHAMAS  11235  0.875 
BAHRAIN  10706  0.79  7173.02 
BANGLADESH  872  0.189  0.17  0.28  0.841  854.56 
BARBADOS  8304  0.928  0.851  0.017  7307.52 
BELGIUM  16381  0.952  0.951  12449.56 
BELIZE  3000  0.689  0.63  0.503  2400 
BENIN  1043  0.113  0.39  0.622  1022.14 
BHUTAN  800  0.15  0.22  0.848  624 
BOLIVIA  1572  0.398  0.39  0.801  1446.24 
BOTSWANA  3419  0.552  0.581  0.434  2153.97 
BRAZIL  4718  0.73  0.652  0.59  0.449  3632.86 
BRUNEI  14000  0.847 
BULGARIA  4700  0.854  3384 
BURKINA FASO  618  0.074  0.24  0.871  593.28 
BURUNDI  625  0.167  0.35  0.805  618.75 
CAMEROON  1646  0.31  0.5  0.34  1349.72 
[LAMBODIA  1100  0.186 
ANADA  19232  0.982  0.948  15193.28 
k::APE VERDE  1769  0.479  0.5  0.36  1645.17 
CENT. AFRICAN REP.  768  0.159  0.2  0.878  783.36 
HAD  559  0.088  0.3  0.563  642.85 
IIILE  5099  0.864  0.831  0.68  0.432  3926.23 
HINA  1990  0.566  0.82  0.126  1134.3 
[L0LOMBIA  4237  0.77  0.72  0.6  0.365  3135.38 
OMOROS  721  0.269  0.53  0.472  764.26 
K:oNGO  2362  0.372  0.46  0.695  1653.4 
OSTARICA  4542  0.852  0.852  O.  0.217  3542.76 
k::OTE D'IVORE  1324  0.286  0.268  0.5  0.236  1138.64 
UBA  2200  0.711  0.78  0.256 
YPRUS  9953  0.89  0.94  0.002  7663.81 
rmCHOSLOV  AKIA  7300  0.925  5256 
PENMARK  16781  0.955  0.936  12921.37 
~JIBOlJl1  1000  0.104  0.33  0.613  1040 
DOMINICAN REP.  2404  0.586  0.6  0.377  2139.56 
!EcUADOR  3074  0.646  0.56.  0.533  2397.72 
EGYPT  1988  0.389  0.383  0.71  0.22  1789.2 
ELSALVADOR  1950  0.503  0.508  0.64  0.279  1930.5 
EQUATORIAL GUII\'EA  700  0.164  0.41  0.666  742 
ETHIOPIA  369  0.172  0.35  0.643  346.86 
FIJI  4427  0.73  0.76  0.156  3674.41 
FINLAND  16446  0.954  0.941  12170.04 
[FRANCE  17405  0.503  0.938  13575.9 
GABON  4147  0.503  0.7  0.166  2612.61 
36 COUNTRY  INC  HDI  DHDI  RWI  [PI  CONS 
GAMB[A  9[3  0.086  0.29[  0.826  830.83 
GERMAN OEM. REP. 
GERMAN FED. REP.  [82[3  0.957  [31 [3.36 
GHANA  [0[6  0.3 [1  0.48  0.524  914.4 
GREECE  7366  0.902  6776.72 
GRENADA  4081  0.787  0.77  3917.76 
GUATEMALA  2576  0.489  0.44  0.647  2369.92 
fJU[NEA  50 I  0.045  0.29  0.672  395.79 
GUlNEA·BlSSAU  84[  0.09  0.32  0.753  933.5 [ 
HAITI  933  0.275  0.38  0.762  923.67 
HONDURAS  [470  0.472  0.436  0.57  0.483  [396.5 
HONG KONG  15595  0.913  0.89 [  [ 0448.65 
HUNGARY  6 [16  0.887  0.896  4464.68 
ICELAND  [6496  0.96  13 [96.8 
INDIA  [072  0.309  0.288  0.54  0.48  857.6 
INDONESIA  2[81  0.5 [5  0.503  0.64  0.398  1374.03 
[RAN  3253  0.557  0.538  0.59  0.475  2602.4 
[RAQ  3508  0.589  0.59  0.501 
IRELAND  [0589  0.925  0.928  7518. [9 
[SRAEL  [0840  0.938  9539.2 
ITALY  [5890  0.924  0.923  [2553. [ 
AMAICA  2979  0.736  0.665  0.58  0.679  2[ [5.09 
APAN  176[6  0.983  0.99  [[626.56 
OROAN  2345  0.582  0.79  O. [31  2556.05 
KENYA  [058  0.369  0.372  0.53  0.515  856.98 
KOREA  6733  0.872  0.897  0.86  0.048  4241.79 
KOREADEM.  2000  0.64  0.158 
KUWAIT  15 [78  0.815  [0472.82 
LAOS  1100  0.246  0.44\  0.8 [ I  1111 
lEBANON  2300  0.565  O.  O. [19 
LESOTHO  [743  0.431  0.54  0.497  2457.63 
LlBER[A  857  0.222  0.54  0.2 [2  702.74 
LIBYA  7000  0.568 
MADAGASCAR  704  0.327  0.53  0.499  647.68 
MALAWI  640  0.168  0.35  0.827  576 
MALAYSIA  6140  0.79  0.743  0.73  0.261  4113.8 
MALDIVES  [ 200  0.497  0.55  0.373 
MALI  572  0.082  0.35  0.462  5 [4.8 
MALTA  8732  0.885  0.87\  0.009  7072.92 
MAURITANIA  1057  0.[4  0.26  0.766  1035.86 
MAURITIUS  5750  0.794  0.779  0.84  0.087  4485 
MEXICO  5918  0.805  0.767  0.67.  0.371  4793.58 
MONGOLIA  2100  0.578  2037 
MOROCCO  2348  0.433  0.52  0.393  1901.88 
MOZAMBIQUE  1072  O. [54  0.34  0.675  [ 200.64 
MYANMAR  659  0.39  0.62  0.384 
NAM[BIA  1400  0.289  [[ 90 
NEPAL  920  0.17  O.ln  0.40  0.593  846.4 
NETIlERLANDS  [5695  0.97  0.972  11614.3 
NEW ZEALAND  134S[  0.947  0.921  10784.8 
NICARAGUA  [497  0.5  0.71  O. [73  [ 526.94 
NIGER  645  0.08  0.45  0.348  632.1 
37 COUNTRY  INC  HDI  DHDI  RWI  IPI  CONS 
NIGERIA  1215  0.246  0.47  0.49  850.5 
NORWAY  16028  0.979  0.956  11379.88 
lOMAN  9972  0.598  0.64  0.188  7179.84 
PAKISTAN  1862  0.311  0.304  0.55  0.271  1638.56 
ANAMA  3317  0.738  0.705  0.77  0.199  2786.28 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  1786  0.318  0.39  0.678  1607.4 
ARAGUAY  2790  0.641  0.65  0.404  2120.4 
PERU  2622  0.592  0.50  0.597  2018.94 
PHILIPPINES  2303  0.603  0.584  0.57  0.577  1934.52 
POLAND  4237  0.831  2669.31 
PORTUGAL  8770  0.853  0.827  6928.3 
QATAR  11400  0.802 
ROMANIA  2800  0.709  2044 
RWANDA  657  0.186  0.32  0.857  630.72 
ST KITTS & NEVIS  3300  0.697  0.71  0.312 
TLUC1A  3470  0.72  0.6  0.377 
ST VINCENT & GRANADINE  3647  0.709  0.6  0.405 
SAO TOME AND PRlNCWE  600  0.374  0.551  0.467  498 
SA UDI ARABIA  10989  0.688  7802.19 
SENEGAL  1248  0.182  0.3  0.659  1135.68 
SEYCHELLES  4191  0.761  0.80  0.085  3688.08 
SIERRA LEONE  1086  0.065  0.34  0.633  1031.7 
SINGAPORE  15880  0.849  0.865  8892.8 
SOMALIA  836  0.087  0.25  0.685  652.08 
SOUTH AFRICA  4865  0.673  3648.75 
SPAIN  11723  0.923  0.928  9261.1 7 
SRI LA1'iKA  2405  0.663  0.636  0.61C  0.419  2044.25 
SUDAN  949  0.152  0.271  0.807  930.02 
SURINAME  3927  0.751  0.76  0.371  3612.84 
SWAZILAND  2384  0.458  0.58  0.444  2026.4 
SWEDEN  5047  0.977  0.963  3987.13 
SWITZERLAND  20874  0.978  0.961  14611.8 
SYRIA  4756  0.694  0.631  0.64.  0.404  4090.16 
ANZAN1A  572  0.27  0.52  0.592  600.6 
rHAlLAND  3986  0.715  0.67  0.74  0.282  2670.62 
TOGO  734  0.218  0.61  0.288  653.26 
rRINIDAD Y TOBAGO  6604  0.877  0.81  0.193  4490.72 
TUNISIA  3579  0.6  0.572  0.72  0.12  2863.2 
ruRKEY  4652  0.717  0.629  0.75  0.113  3814.64 
UGANDA  524  0.194  0.37  0.802  529.24 
UAE  16753  0.738  10051.8 
UK  15804  0.964  0.948  13117.32 
USSR 
ARMENIA  4741  0.831 
AZERBAIAN  3977  0.77 
BELARUS  5727  0.861 
ESTONIA  6438  0.872 
GEORG[A  4572  0.829 
KAZAKHSTAN  47[6  0.802 
KYRGYZSTAN  31 [4  0.689 
LATV[A  6457  0.868 
[THUANIA  4913  0.868 
38 COUNTRY  INC  HOI  OHOI  RWI  IPI  CONS 
~10WOVA  3896  0.758 
RUSSIA  7968  0.862 
A,IIKTSTA.N  2558  0.657 
lJRKMENISTAN  4230  0.746 
UKRAI0:E  5433  0.844 
UZBEKIo,TAN  3115  0.695 
USA  21449  0.976  0.944  18231.65 
URUGUAY  5916  0.881  0.80  0.179  4732.8 
VANUATU  2005  0.533  1824.55 
VENEZUELA  6169  0.824  0.793  0.73  0.22 I  4379.99 
VIETNAM  1100  0.472  0.58  0.586 
~EMEN  1562  0.233  0.55.  0.272  1437.04 
YEMENPDR  0.55  0.279 
YUGOSLAVIA  0.868 
iZAlRE  367  0.262  0.36  0.802  322.96 
izAMBIA  744  0.314  0.325  0.45  0.791  617.52 
!"IMBABWE  1484  0.398  0.53  0.543  1172.36 
NOTES: 
Data on population growth (POPG) are obtained from the UN population statistics. 
Data on agricultural share of GDP (AGSHARE) are obtained from the World Bank's 
World Tables 1992. Data on rural population as percentage of total population are 
obtained irom the Human Development Report 1994. Data on the export of goods and 
non factor services's share of GDP are obtained from the World Bank's World Tables 
1992. 
39 APPENDIX  B:  RESULTS 
All models  use cross-sectional data  Regression coefficients  are estimated using ordinary 
least squares, the residuals being tesled for hetffoscedasticity using a Lagrdllge Multiplier 
test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979).  If the hypothesis that the error term is  homoscedastic  is 
rejected  While's  hetffoscedasticity  consistent variances  and standard  errors  are used to 
make statistical infffences about the true parameter values,  The results  are presented  for 
each environmental indicator below: 
I. LACK OF SAFE WATER: 
The data set consists of obsffvations on percentage of population with access to  safe watff 
(ACH20) on 123 countries for 1990.  However, the size of the sample in  each regression 
depends on the nnmber of obsErVations of the independent variables that are available (see 
tabes for details). 
To obtain a measure  of "lack  of safe watff"  (LACKW),  we transform the data in  the 
following  way: LACKW= 100  - ACH20.  Note that there  are  sevffal  countries  in  the 
sample with 100 per cent access  to  safe watff in  terms  of population.  This  means  that 
LACKW=O  for such countries.  To be able to  take the logarithm  of LACKW  without 
having to reject any obsffvation, we define LNLACKW as LOG(I+LACKW). 
The best fit  models  are linear.  Model  I (a)  does not include  country  specific  variables. 
LNLACKW  is  regressed  on  a  constant  term  and  the  logarithm  of per  capita  GOP 
(INCOME). Access to safe watff increases with income. Model I(b) adds the logarithm of 
population  growth  (POPG)  and  the  logarithm  of rural  population'S  share  of  total 
population (RUPOP)  to  the set of independent variables.  This  seems  to  snggest  tha~ 
income level given,  rapi:lly  growing  populations  and populations that do  not gather  on 
urban concentrations will find it more difficult to  provide access  to  safe watff to  all their 
com[Xments. 
The coefficients  are  individually  and  jointly  significant.  However,  the  Breusch-Pagdll 
statistic in  model  I(a) is  5.22782 and the 95  per cent critical value for chi-squared [I] is 
3.84.  The Breusch-Pagan statistic in  Model  I(b) is  11.2627 and  the 95  per cent critical 
value for chi-squared [3]  is  7.82.  Both indicate  hetffoscedasity  and,  therefore,  reduced 
efficiency  of  the  estimates.  As  the  problem  appears  to  lie  with  outliers  we  drop 
obsffvations 34,43,44,75 and 106 (Congo, Ecuador, Egypt,  Jordan and Oman).  The new 
sample is  fomed by  118 countries.  The results  are reported as  Models  \(a)* and I(b)* 
After  dropping  these  five  obsffvations  it  is  easier  to  mantain  the  assumption  of 
homoscedasticity (at least for the regressions on income and consumption).  We carry out 
a similar analysis for the rest of the economic/social performance indicators. 
Models 2(a),  2(b),  2(a)* and 2(b)*  correspond to the regressions having the logarithm of 
consumption (CONSUMPTICN) as the main independent variable.  The results  are almost 
identical to  those  for INCOME.  Models  3(a),  3(b),  3(a)*  and 3(b)*  correspond to  the 
regression having  HDI as  the main independent variable.  Models  5(a),  5(b),5(a)*  and 
5(b)*  give the estimates  for the regressions when IPI is  the main independent variable. 
Hcre we have not been as  lucky  as  before correcting the hetffoscedastic  estimates.  The 
computed B-P statistics still exceed the critical chi-squared value at the 5 per cent level of 
significance.  While's hetffoscedasticity-corrected t ratios are reported in bold On the basis 
of While's estimators the OLS regressors are statistically significant 
As regards DHOI,  we only report Models 4(a) and 4(b),  since the Breusch-Pagdll 
test fails  to  reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.  (Nole that there are no  data on 
OHDl for four out of the five countries considered outliers in the sample). 
40 Table Bl. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LACK OF SAFEWATFR ANDINCCME 
Dependent variable: Lack of safe water (in logs) 
VARIABLE  1  (a)  1(b)  1  (a!  l(b! 
constanl  11.849  6.2676  12.038  7.2'J37 
(22.015)  (5.580)  (24.262)  (6.652) 
(25.501)  (4.473)  (27.582)  (5.594) 
INCCME  -1.l495  -0.67034  -1.1757  -0.74985 
(-17.181)  (-7.090)  (-19.056)  (-8.125) 
(·18.959)  (·5.709)  (.20.906)  (·6.768) 
RUPCF  0.41489  0.31319 
(3.272)  (2.576) 
(2.870)  (2.339) 
POPG  0.46513  0.44045 
(5.882)  (5.840) 
(5.375)  (5.485) 
AdjlSted R'  0.70  0.78  0.75  0.81 
F  295.17  149  363  174.18 
B-P chieiquared  5.22782[11  11.2627[3)  2.81732[1)  9.05542[3) 
N  123  123  118  118 
I able B2 RELAtIONSHIP BEl wEEN LACK OF SAFE WAlEk AND 
CONSUMPTION 
Dependent variable: Lack of safe water (in logs) 
VARIABLE  2(a)  2(b)  2(a!  2(b! 
constant  12.503  6.5881  1  2.646  7.3951 
(21.881)  (5.714)  (23.745)  (6.529) 
(25.051)  (4.637)  (26.721)  (5.466) 
CONSUMPTION  -1.2607  -0.73741  -1.2816  -0.&)130 
(-17.365)  (-7.196)  (-18.937)  (-7.957) 
(.19.131)  (.5.802)  (.20.805)  (·6.577) 
RUPCF  0.43951  0.35892 
(3.530)  (2.988) 
(3.207)  (2.752) 
POPG  0.44296  0.42524 
(5.577)  (5.552) 
(4.932)  (5.031) 
A<iiusted R'  0.71  0.79  0.76  0.82 
F  301.52  152.09  358.60  172.43 
B-P chi-5guared  3.62807[1)  11.2660[3)  1.43765[11  7.83460[3) 
N  118  118  113  113 
Note;: 
I )All variables arc in  logs 
2)t-statistic in parentheses,  White's heterosceru;ticity--corn:cted t ratio in  bold 
41 I  able B3 RELAIIONSHiP BEl WEEN  LACK OF SAFEWAIM ANORDI 
Dependent variable: Lack of safe water (in logs) 
VARIABLE  3(a)  3(b)  3(ar 
constant  4.9335  1.4007  4.9349 
(28.749)  (2.317)  (29.311) 
(39.601)  (2.185)  (39.968) 
HDI  -0040418  -0.019705  -0.040577 
(-14.R96)  (-5.530)  (-15.339) 
(·16.847)  (·5.142)  (·16.996 ) 
RUPeI'  0.55804 
(4.308) 
(4.176) 
POPG  0.51025 
(6.046) 
(5.557) 
Atljl.tedR'  0.64  0.75  0.66 
F  221.9  127.73  235.29 
B-P chi-squared  8.12902[1)  16.2745[31  8.47418(11 
N  123  123  118 
Table B4  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LACK OF SAFE WATER AND 
DISTRIBUTICN-ADJUSTED HDI 


























































42 labE BS  RELAIIONSHIP BEl WEEN  LACKOF SAFE WAlEk ANDrp! 
Dependent variable: Lack of safe water (in logs) 
VARIABLE  5(a)  5(b)  5(at 
constant  2.2933  0.16834  2.3425 
(13.106)  (0.264)  (13.204) 
(8.783)  (0.264 )  (8.717) 
IPI  0.023865  0.012441  0.022968 
(7.152)  (3.136)  (6.861) 
(5.418)  (3.596)  (5.074) 
RUPCF  0.48117 
(2.744) 
(2.507) 
POPG  0.82855 
(5.078) 
(4.470) 
Adj ll<ted R 2  0.35  0.55  0.35 
F  51  38  47 
B-P chi-squared  29.5936[1]  16.2754[3]  28.2021[l] 
N  91  91  86 
Noto;.: 
I )All  variables except IPI are in logs 


















Table B6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LACK OF SAFE WATER AND RWI 












I )All variables except RWI are in logs 





























43 2.  SULPHUR EMISSIONS: 
Tesring [or heteroscedlliticily  fail<;  to  reject the null hypothesis of spherical  disturbances 
for all our regressions. As regards country-specific factors,  RUPCP proves to be the only 
,ignificunt variable.  Models  are numbered  in  the same way as  the previous  section.  In 
general,  the best fit is  given by a quadratic function  in CONSUMPTION and INCOME. 
We do nottakeIPI into account as the sample is reduced to only 17 countries. 
The best fit FOR HDI and DHDI may be linear.  On the basis of the OLS t statistics in  tab~ 
2.4 DHDI2  and RUPCP are not significant  However,  the sample size has been reduced 
considerably and, even though the B-P chi -squared statistics are not above critical values, 
they are close.  White's heteroscedlliticily consistent standard errors  are much larger than 
the OLS standard errors and so estimated t values  are much larger than those obtained by 
OLS.The  RUPCP  regressor  is  significant  whereas  the  DHDI2  regressor's  statistic 
improves but not enough as to consider it significant at any sensible level. 
Tab~s also report turning points for quadratic forms.  As  regards  INCCME,  the turrring 
point  is  close  to  8000 PPP$.  The  sample  ranges  from  659  to  21450  PPP$  .  For 
CONSUMPTION the turning point is  in  the neighbourhood of 6500 PPP$.  The sample 
ranges from 1111 to  18231PPP$ and, again,  countries such as  Portugal woukl be at the 
infrxion point. For HDI and DHDI the quadratic formis not signiiicative. 
Tab~ B7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SULPHUR EMISSIONS ANDINCCME 



























1  )AII  variables are in logs (turning points in levds) 


















2)t-statisric in parrntheses,  White's heterosced:6ticity-comcted t ratio in bold 
44 I  abE B8 RED\tION SffiP BEtWEEN  SOLPHUR ENiISSla<JS AND 
CONSUMPTION 












































Table B9 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SULPHUR EMISSIONS ANDHDI 
Dependent variable: Sulphur emissions (in logs) 
VARIABLE  3(a)  3(b)  3(e) 
constant  -1.8370  0.54961  -0.85428 
(-2.Q26)  (0.375)  (-1.628) 
(-1.468)  (0.337)  (-1.563) 
HDI  0.090694  0.097118  0.049286 
(2.838)  (2.770)  (7.402) 
(2.110)  (2.009)  (7.195) 
HD1'  -0. UJ034464  -0.UJ050258 
(-1.325)  (-1.743) 
(-1.022)  (-1.373) 
RUPCP  -0.54731 
(-2.260) 
(-2.493) 
Turning poim  1.315 (ERR) 
Adjllitcd R'  0.45  0.52  0.45 
F  328.59  18.88  54.79 
B-P chi-ssuared  1.14857[2]  0.918947[3J  0.138158[IJ 
N  66  50  66 
Note;: 
I )AIl  variables excEpt  HDI are in logs 
















45 IabE BID REIAIIONSHiP BEtWEEN  SOLPHUR EMISSiCNS AND 
DISlRIBUTICN-ADJUSTED HI1 






































































IabEBII. RELAIIONSHIPBEIWEEN DEFtRESIAlION  ANDINCUVlE 









B-P chi -5quared 
N 
Note;: 


































2)t-5tatistic in parmtheses, White's hetcrosceda;ticitx-colTocted t ratio in  bold 
46 faDi B  I2 RELAI ION SHIP BEl WEEN  DEFLRES fAlUN ANDCONSOMP hUN 












































Table B 13.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFCRESTATION ANDHDI 













































1  lAIl  variables excEpt  HDI are in logs (turning points in levds) 
2)t-stalislic in parmtheses White"s hctcroscedaaicity-corrocted t ratio in bold 
47 laGE B14.  RELAttONSHIP  BEt WEEN  DEFCRES tAttON  AND DIS tRill 0 ttCN-
ADJUSTED HDI 
Dependent variable: Deforestation (in logs) 
VARIABLE  4(a)  4(b) 
constant  0.25596  -1.7882 
( 1.370)  (-2.281) 
(1.962)  (-1.849) 
DHDI  0.027845  0.023952 
(2.858)  (2.547) 
(3.280)  (3.229) 
DHDf  -0.00028458  -0.00017242 
(-2.980)  (-1.636) 
(-4.354  )  (-1.904) 
RUPCP  0.33465 
(2.678) 
(2.195) 
Turning Point  0.046  0.058 
Aqt USled R2  0.08  0.17 
F  4.09  5.38 
B-P chi-squared  13.599612)  7.33021[3] 
N  65  65 
Table BIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFCRESTATION ANDIPI 
Dependent variable: Deforestation (in logs) 
VARIABLE  Sea)  5(b)  5(c) 
constant  0.76108  0.55193  -0.57263 
(4.624)  (I. 789)  (-0.626)) 
(3.876)  (2.011)  (-0.790) 
!PI  -0.00013595  0.010088  0.011776 
(-0.047)  (0.726)  (0.859) 
( -0.041)  (0.789)  (0.915) 
IPI'  -0.00010221  -0.000095617 
(-0.733)  (-0.696) 
(-0.733)  (-0.707) 
RUPCP  0.25224 
(I.  708) 
(1.348) 
Turning Point 
-0.0l9(ERR)  0.007  Adj lISted R' 
F 






N  62  62  62 
Notes: 
I )AIl  variables except !PI are in  logs 
2)t-statistic in parentheses, White's heterosced'f;ticity-corm:ted t  ratio in bold 
48 Table B 16 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFORESTATION AND RWl 
Dependent variable:  rate of deforestation  (in  logs) 
VARIABLE  (a)  (b)  (e) 
constant  0.60165  -0.37542  -2.0175 
(2.730)  (-0.525)  (-2.033) 
(2.469)  ( -0.460)  (-1.614) 
RWl  0.0029276  0.042825  0.044242 
(0.720)  ( 1.524)  (1.630) 
(0.579)  (1.259)  (1.372) 
RWl2  -0.00037412  -0.00033216 
(-1.434)  (-1.316) 
(-1.111)  (-1.079) 
RUPOP  0.35544 
(2.304) 
(1.946) 
Adjusted R2  -0.007(ERR)  0.009  0.07 
F  0.51  1.29  2.69 
B-P chi-~quared  8.96054[1]  11.849512]  7.53936[31 
N  62  62  62 
Notes: 
I )All  variables except RWI are in logs 
2)t-statistic in parentheses. White's heteroscedasticity-corrected ratio in bold 
49 3.  CARBON EMISSIONS: 
The rcl<ltionship is  monotonically increasing.  AGSHARE is  the most significant country-
specific  factor.  RUPCP  is  significant when AGSHARE is  not included  EXPSHA is 
included in the fhird model of the tabes in  this section.  It does not add much explanatory 
power to the regression except when fhe performance indicator is CONSUMPTION. 
Table B 17  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN C02 EMISSIONS AND INCCME 
Dependent variable: Carbon emissions (in logs) 
VARlABLE  l(a)  l(b)  I (c) 
constant  -12.222  -8.1213  -9.1323 
(-22862)  (-6.289)  (-6.542) 
(-23.651)  (-5.833 )  (-5.864) 
INCCME  1.3957  1.0408  1.0666 
(21.065)  (8.720)  (8.978) 
(22.138)  (8.169)  (8.038) 
AGSHARE  -0.47139  -0.40302 
(-3.329)  (-2.729) 
(-2.989)  (-2.395) 
EXPSHA  0.17086 
(1.423) 
(1.500) 
AdjLlSted R- 0.74  0.76  0.78 
F  443.73  230.11  161.15 
B-P chi-squarcd  0.802206[1]  6.80381[2)  6.16373[3] 
N  150  143  135 
Table B 18 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN C02 EMISSIONS AND CONSUMPTION 
Dependent variable: Carbon emissions (in logs) 
VARlABLE  2(a)  2(b)  2(e) 
constant  -12.488  -7.2389  -8.4051 
(-20.282)  (-5.217)  (-5.547) 
(-20.984  )  (-4.944  )  (-5.103) 
INCCME  1.4574  J.(XJ27  1.0168 
(18.638)  (7.527)  (7.WO) 
(19.687)  (7.234)  (7.167) 
AGSHARE  -0.62754  -0.53245 
(-4.258)  (-3.435) 
(-3.890)  (-3.111) 
EXPSHA  0.24170 
(1.831) 
(1.963) 
Adjusted R'  0.72  0.75  0.76 
F  347.38  201.17  137.71 
B-P chi-squarcd  1.31678[1]  4.15931[2]  3.29637[3] 
N  132  130  130 
Notes: 
1  )All  variables are in logs 
2)t-5[atistic in  parentheses, "White's hcttroscedEticity-corre::ted t ratio  in bold 
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Table  B20 RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  C02 EMISSIONS  AND OISTRffiUTICN-
ADJUSTED HOI 
Dependent variable: Carbon emissions (in logs) 
VARIABLE  1  (a)  l(b)  l(c) 
constant  -4.0858  -2.5659  -2.1406 
(-13.745)  (-3.258)  (-2.152) 
(-11.609)  ( -3.222)  (-1.845) 
DHDI  0.050880  0.041098  0.041166 
(13030)  (6.6)6)  (6.671) 
(12.077)  (6.616)  (6.687) 
AGSHARE  -0.34497  -0.37610 
(-2.092)  (-2.192) 
(-2.192)  (-2.045) 
EXPSHA  -0.10734 
(-0.707) 
(-0.626) 
Adju,ted R'  0.76  0.78  0.77 
F  169.77  90.39  59.8 
B-P chi-flquared  5.28301(1)  7. 12684[2J  8.05455[3J 
N  52  51  51 
Notes: 
1  )AII  variahles excEpt  DHDI are in logs 
2)t-slatistic in  parmtheses, White's hctcroscedt;ticity-corncted t ratio in bold 
51 I able B2I RELAIIONSHIP BEl WEEN em EMISSIONS ANDIPI 
Dependent variable: Carbon emissions (in logs) 
VARIABLE  5(a)  5(b)  5(c) 
constant  0.12095  2.8053  1.8173 
(0.533)  (7.295)  (2.296) 
(0.659)  (8.620)  (2.272) 
!PI  -0.011972  -0.023041  -0.020012 
(-9.368)  (-5.371 )  (-4.490) 
(-11.6S0)  (-5.554  )  (-4.573) 
AGSHARE  -1.1590  -1.1213 
(-7.903)  (-7.047) 
(-S.058)  (-7.031) 
EXPSHA  0.20972 
(1.400) 
(1.313) 
Adiu>ted R- 0.45  0.65  0.66 
F  87.75  100.78  65.83 
B-P chi-squared  0.325804[1]  3.9(18412)  3.89688[3] 
N  107  107  98 
Note;;: 
I )AII  variables but !PI are in logs 
2)t-statistic in  parentheses,  White's hetcrosccdt;ticity-comcted t ratio  in  bold 
Table B22 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN C02 EMISSIONS AND RWI 
Dependent  variable:  Carbon  emissions  (in  logs) 
VARIABLE  (a)  (b)  (c) 
constant  -5.2871  -0.74456  -1.5753 
(-16.723)  (-1.066)  (-1.754) 
(-17.632)  ( -1. lOS)  (-1.S4S) 
RWI  0.062122  0.036625  0.036272 
(11.644)  (6.402)  (5.949) 
(13.406)  (6.608)  (5.760) 
AGSHARE  -1.0188  -0.93302 
(-7.012)  (-5.896) 
(-7.314)  ( -6.135) 
EXPSHA  0.1402 
(1.217) 
(1.086) 
Adjusted R2  0.55  0.69  0.70 
F  135.57  123.47  79.58 
B-P chi-squared  2.6844\[ I)  4.43493[2)  5.56647[3) 
N  107  107  99 
Notes: 
1  lAIl  variable~ except RWT arc in logs 
2)t-statistic in parentheses, White's hctcroscedasticity-corrected ratio in bold 
52 Seldon T.M. and Song D. 1994.  Environmental quality and development: is there a 
Kuznets curve for air pollution emissions?  Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 27:  147-l62. 
Sen A.  1  'Fl6. Poverty: an ordinal approach to measurement, Econometrica 44(2): 219-
24l. 
Shafik N.  1994.  Economic development and environmental quality: an econometric 
analysis, Oxford Economic Papers 46: 757-773. 
Shafik N.  and S. Bandyopadhay. 1992.  Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: 
Time  Series  and  Cross Country  Evidence,  Background Paper for  the  World 
Development Report, 1992.  The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Stern D., Common M.S. and Barbier E.B. 1996.  Economic growth and environmental 
degradation: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and sustainable development, 
World Development 24(7): 1151-1160. 
Tolba M.K.  EI-Kholy O.A. E1-Hinnawi, E.,  Holdgate, M.W.,  McMichael,  D.F.  and 
Munn, R.E.  eds.  1992.  The World Environment  1972-1992: Two Decades of 
Challenge.  United  Nations  Environment  Programme.  Chapman  and  Hall, 
London. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCED, 1993. Agenda 
21: The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio, New York, UN. 
United Nations Development Programme  UNDP,  1992-1996.  Human  Development 
Reports 1992-1996. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 1994 
United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organisation  UNIDO  1992.  Industry  and 
Development: Global Report. UNIDO Vienna. 
World Bank,  1992-1996.  World Development Reports  1992-1996.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
World Bank, 1  994a-1996a.  Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 
1994-1996. World Bank, Washington DC. 
World  Commission on  Environment and Development WCED,  1987.  Our Common 
Future.  Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
World Resource Institute 1994. World Resources 1994-1995. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Worldwatch Institute, 1995. 
54 References 
Anderson K. and Blackhurst R.  1992.  Trade, the environment and public policy.  In 
Anderson K.  and Blackhurst R. The Greening of World Trade Issues, Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf: 3-22. 
Antle I.M. and Heidebrink G.1995. Environment and development: theory and 
international evidence, Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(3): 603-
625. 
Arrow K., Bolin B., Costanza R., Dasgupta P., Folke c., Holling C.S., Jansson B.-O., 
Levin S., Maler K.-G., Perrings C. and Pimentel D. 1995. Economic Growth, 
Carrying Capacity, and the Environment, Science 268: 520-521. 
Barbier E.B.  1997. Introduction to the Environmental Kuznets Curve special issue, 
Environment and Development Economics 2(4): in press. 
Beckerman W. 1992. Economic growth and the environment: whose growth? whose 
environment?  World Development 20: 481-496. 
CDIAC 1992 Estimates of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning and cement 
manufacturing, based on the United Nations Energy Statistics and the US 
Bureau of Mines and Cement Manufacturing Data.  Numeric package - 0301R4. 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge. 
Cole M.A., Rayner A.I. and Bates I.M. 1997. The Environmental Kuznets Curve: an 
empirical analysis, Environment and Development Economics 2(4): in press. 
Cropper M. and Griffiths C.  1994.  The interaction of population growth and 
environmental quality, American Economic Review 84(2): 250-254. 
de Bruyn S.M.  1997. Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve: structural change 
and international agreements in reducing sulphur emissions, Environment and 
Development Economics 2(4): in press. 
Grossman G.M. and Krueger A.B. 1993. Environmental impacts of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, in Garber P. (ed) The US-Mexico Free Trade 
Agreement, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.  . 
Grossman G.M. and Krueger A.B. 1995.  Economic growth and the environment, 
Quarterly Iournal of Economics 110(2): 353-377. 
Holtz-Eakin D. and Seldon T.M. 1995.  Stoking the fires? CO, emissions and 
economic growth, Iournal of Public Economics 57: 85-101. 
Iazairy I,  Almagir M., and Panuccio T. 1992  The State of World Rural Poverty, IT 
Publications for IF  AD, London 
Kato N. and Akimoto M.  1992.  Anthropogenic emissions of S02 and NO, in Asia: 
emission inventories, Atmospheric Environment 26A(l6): 2997-3017. 
Kuznets S.  1955. Economic growth and income inequality, American Economic 
Review 49:  1-28. 
McConnell K.E. 1997. Income and the demand for environmental quality, Environment 
and Development Economics 2(4): in press. 
Meadows, D. H. Meadows, D. L.  Randers, J.  and Behrens, W. W. 1972. The Limits 
to Growth. London, Earth Island. 
Moomaw W.R. and Unruh G.c. 1997. Are Environmental Kuznets Curves misleading 
us? The case of CO2 emissions, Environment and Development Economics 
2( 4): in press. 
Munasinghe M.  and Cruz,  W.  1995.  Economywide Policies  and the  Environment, 
World Bank Environment Paper 10, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Panayotou T.  1995. Environmental degradation at different stages of economic 
development, in Ahmed I. and Doelman I.A. (eds) Beyond Rio: the 
environmental crisis and sustainable livelihoods in the Third World. London, 
Macmillan Press. 
Panayotou T. 1997. Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve: turning a black 
box into a policy tool, Environment and Development Economics 2(4): in press. 
Pearce D.W. and Warford 1.  1993. World Without End, 
53 